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How The European Union's Criteria For Membership Move Public Opinion

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HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP MOVE PUBLIC
OPINION

by

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ABSTRACT

Existing studies suggest that normative commitments to the European Union's human rights standards remain weak in states applying for EU membership, and that citizens are unresponsive to information the EU provides. This research does not gauge public support for human rights when they are framed as an EU issue. In an original experimental survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I examine the effect of EU framing on support for the equal treatment of gay people, equal pay between women and men, and blame assigned to the government for policy outcomes regarding these rights. I find that EU frames affect blame towards the government, which in turn influences support for women's rights. EU frames produce a negative effect on support for women's rights among those who support their state's independence from the EU. Moreover, the EU establishes equal pay for equal work as a criterion for applicant states. Conventional wisdom holds that governments meet criteria for membership in order to gain benefits from membership. In another experimental survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I examine the effect of framing equal pay as a criterion for membership. Among those who believe that economic benefits from EU membership are likely, framing gender equality as necessary for EU membership elicited higher levels of support for gender equality, in comparison to those who believe that benefits are unlikely. The EU also has recently set up standards for membership regarding gay rights, but commitment to the standards remains weak. This lack of commitment presents a puzzle for researchers and policymakers: if the EU's gay rights standards have minimal consequences, then why

would anyone want to hand over powers concerning gay rights to the EU? I find that those who identify more closely with gay people are more likely to vote for parties that want to transfer control of gay rights to the EU. Since the EU currently lacks effective gay rights standards, this study establishes an evidence-based imperative for the EU to use its capacities to serve gay constituencies directly, such as providing shelters and counselling for gay people and their families.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Governments aspiring to join the European Union (EU) must meet certain criteria beforehand. These criteria not only affect the political elites, but also influence the policies supported or opposed by citizens. For instance, in Turkey, where Turkish nationalism remains a popular political attitude, the political criteria ask the government to allow more expressions of Kurdish culture (CEC 2012b; IRI 2012). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where existing institutional arrangements provide vetoes for Bosnian, Croat, and Serb interests; the political criteria ask the government to create an organ that speaks in one voice on matters of EU policy (CEC 2012a; NDI 2009). The criteria for social policy ask all applicant countries to promote women's rights and gay rights, including equal-pay-for-equal-work and equal treatment in the workplace. Do public attitudes and behavior pertaining to rights change along with the candidate state's laws? In this dissertation, I examine whether the EU accession process influences citizen opinions on the gender equality and gay rights, policies that are necessary for membership.

I argue that citizens affirm their desire for EU membership by validating the EU's prescriptions concerning gender equality and gay rights. In particular, I examine equal-pay-for-equal-work between women and men, and equal treatment in the workplace for gay people. I expect that the European Union serves as a 'perceptual anchor' for opinion

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formation in applicant states. In other words, when a policy proposal for equal pay or equal treatment emphasizes its status as a criterion for EU membership, public opinion moves in the proposal's favor, among those who are favorable towards membership and among those who see economic benefits in membership. I expect that the opinions of citizens move favorably among these groups towards gender equality proposals, which emphasize advancement towards EU membership. The goal of EU membership would increase commitment to gender equality not only in the laws passed by politicians but also in the commitment to gender equality and gay rights in the attitudes of citizens. The EU seeks to create European-wide solutions for European-wide problems like discrimination, but this promotion of rights also may have unintended consequences. People who oppose membership, oppose the values the EU espouses, or do not perceive economic benefits from EU membership may not respond favorably to the EU's interventions.

In this dissertation, I carried out two population-based survey experiments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an applicant state in the EU accession process. The first survey included hypothetical newspaper articles on gender equality, a criteria for membership, which address equal pay as advancing EU membership (or not). These newspaper vignettes also prime respondents to consider the importance of meeting the criteria for membership or prime respondents to consider that eventual membership is certain (both of these types of rhetoric are used by EU officials when promoting membership). This treatment allows me to better distinguish between sincere opinion movement and strategic support for gender equality because EU membership is at stake. I split the sample of respondents into those who perceive economic benefits from EU membership

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and those who do not. I can examine the treatment effects within these groups. My aim was to observe the influences of this experimental manipulation on 1) support for equal pay, 2) one's likelihood to vote for parties that support for equal pay, 3) and one's likelihood to pay higher taxes to achieve equal pay. The experimental design allowed me to assess the perceptual anchor hypothesis: public opinion moves favorably towards issues emphasizing membership, among those perceiving benefits.

The second survey included the issues of equal pay for equal work between women and men, and equal treatment for gay people in the work place. These issues are framed as either conditions for EU member (or not). These issues also are primed with information saying that conditions for women and gay people (equal pay for equal work between women and men, equal treatment in the workplace for gay people) are particularly bad, and the survey addresses whether the government should be blamed for these bad conditions. My aim was to observe the influence of these treatments on 1) support for equal pay (or evaluation biases), and who is to blame for bad conditions for these rights (or attribution biases). Hence, we can observe whether EU frames can trigger biases for or against women's rights and gay rights. Understanding these biases is consequential for marginalized people in applicant states.

After conducting the first survey which focuses on gender equality, I took up the issue of gay rights in this study in order to assess issues with different levels of popularity and the credibility of EU standards in applicant states. Commitment to the European Union's gay rights standards remains weak in countries applying for EU membership. Homophobia is acute in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the country provides a case where people who identify with gay people may desire new governance in the form of

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institutions that are external to the state. For instances, 55 percent of respondents do not think it is appropriate to report job promotions that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, 55 percent of respondents tend to not see the government as responsible for the treatment of gay people, 66 percent of respondents said they would be less likely to help lobby for gay rights if a gay rights activist asked them to help, and 72 percent of respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to gay people as a social group (1.5 percent identify as extremely close to gay people as a group).

This project is significant for several reasons. I specify an international stimulus on domestic society which conditionally increases and decreases favorability in the populace towards gender equality: the EU's criteria for membership. When gender equality is tied to membership, support for gender equality increases or decreases based on underlying predispositions. I anticipate not only increased favorable attitudes but also more tangible manifestations of gender equality support such as supporting women's rights activists' efforts to lobby politicians about gender equality, and turning in discriminating employers to state authorities. I also anticipate increases in support for gender equality even if membership seems guaranteed, which would suggest a deeper normative commitment among people to gender equality beyond achieving EU membership.

The project also will advance the scholarship on domestic support for international organizations by experimentally testing the influence of the EU on opinion formation among citizens, as opposed to establishing correlations with observational data (Gabel 1998). By examining the role of international organizations in opinion formation, this project elucidates the impact of transnational actors on state-society relations

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(changing opinions on the conditions contained in national agreements) (Risse 2010). Hence, this project advances research on Europeanization by specifying and testing a causal link between the EU and attitudes on domestic policies in Europe (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). EU-based opinion formation, if it exists, implies a changing relationship between citizens and a supranational polity; where one's attention shifts away from the state government and towards a new political center (Haas 1958). The EU may play an important role in opinion formation and can lead to objections in the populace, which are key for public participation in democracies that can hold elites accountable for their actions (Disch 2011).

While elaborating on reasons for people's support for the EU and its policies, existing literature does not examine the influence of the EU on opinion formation. The EU public opinion literature is missing causal links between national level sentiments and sentiments about the EU (Gaxie 2011, 11). As Gaxie (2011) contends about death penalty attitudes in Europe, "correlations can be observed between survey responses on the death penalty and European integration, but this does not imply that interviewees make reference to the death penalty when asked about European integration" (11). Studies of the individual economic context suggest that people make reference to the costs and benefits of the EU when assessing deeper integration, but do not show whether or how people take the EU into consideration when making decisions. Essentially, the link between European integration attitudes and individual perceptions of other issues is not clear.

In the following sections, I first discuss advancements in the study of public opinion on European integration and the criteria for EU membership. I theorize that

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issues emphasizing advancement towards EU membership move opinions. After establishing the theory and hypotheses, I explain my issue selection (gender equality and gay rights) and case selection (Bosnia and Herzegovina). I then elaborate on my testing strategy, which uses survey experiments with a state-wide representative samples of citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From there, I describe the contents of the three empirical chapters of the dissertations.

1.1 A THEORY OF OPINION FORMATION AND EU MEMBERSHIP

Governments aspire to join the European Union (EU) in order to gain closer access to European markets, join influential EU decision-making bodies, and attain many other benefits. These enticements influence the populace which subjectively perceive benefits such as access to a greater variety of goods, ease of travel, EU structural funds, and the prestige of being 'more European' (just to name a few). In order to join, governments pass laws in order to comply with EU standards. The EU criteria on which I focus are gender equality and gay rights, which require reforms among all prospective members. These issue areas, which concerns equal treatment in the workplace, workplace conditions, unfair hiring/firing, maternity leave, pregnancy, and pensions; has broad implications for the quality of life and well-bring of citizens. In particular, I examine equal-pay-for-equal-work between women and men, and equal treatment in the workplace for gay people. This study has important implications for the question of whether normative change among citizens concerning gender equality and gay rights accompanies the state's legal changes when trying to join the EU.

My argument is that citizens affirm their desire for EU membership by validating the EU's prescriptions for applicant state governments pertaining to women's rights and

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gay rights. Sponsorship by institutions influences opinions by serving as a "perceptual anchor that shades the interpretation of information" (such as hearing that one's political party supports a policy proposal) (Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013, 60). I posit that the EU serves as a 'perceptual anchor' for opinion formation in candidate states. In a similar way to considerations of political parties, it is consequential for citizens' opinion formation when human rights become associated with the EU.

Public opinion and experimental research (especially from American politics) offer suggestions about how to study the influence of the European Union on opinion formation. Public opinion studies since Campbell et al. (1960) have highlighted the centrality of political parties in individuals' political identity. In domestic politics, parties compete and present varying messages to their constituencies. Experimental studies manipulate party cues and issue frames, and their findings suggest that party cues matter (influencing issue support and vote choices) (Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013; Slothuus 2010). These results follow partisan motivated reasoning theory, which posits that individuals hold stronger views and ascribe more importance to attitudes if they confirm prior beliefs (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013; Slothuus 2010).

Likewise, EU officials, domestic politicians (for and against the EU) have gotten involved in spreading information about EU membership as well as the criteria for membership (often in the form of civil society dialogues between civil society groups and government/EU officials). If the EU accession process influences public opinion, and the EU becomes a 'perceptual anchor' for one's calculations about domestic policies, then the theory would predict an 'EU-based partisan reasoning' emerging among membership

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supporters. Policy proposals that confirm their belief in EU advancement (a policy proposal touting EU membership) would engender more support for that policy. I expect greater support among citizens for policy proposals on equal pay, when they emphasize their role in the advancement towards EU membership. In particular, I examine the effect of this emphasis on those who perceive benefits from the EU, those who agree with the principles of EU's gender equality policies, and those who desire EU membership. The surveys reflect the goal of testing for experimental treatment effects among these groups.

I argue that citizens react to the EU's prescriptions for candidate governments. However, this is not an argument that only pertains to the EU's involvement in women's rights and gay rights, but also how the EU is involved. By establishing criteria (or hoops for the state to jump through in order to gain membership), the EU also is incentivizing citizens and perhaps being punitive as well by threatening to withhold membership. Hence, my first experimental survey includes an experiment which examines that effect of EU conditionality (setting up the criteria for membership). The EU may be affecting different groups based on their sense of benefits from the EU and based on their feelings of agreement with the values the EU espouses. For marginalized peoples and their advocates a worry could be that the EU's conditions for membership could perturb people who don't see benefits in EU membership, and/or people who do not agree with the EU's human rights standards. Constituencies could be turned away from human rights by the EU's involvement.

Strategic cost/benefit decision-making arguably plays a role in the decision-making of candidate state populaces when they evaluate gender equality. I expect that the EU emphasis effect from hypothesis one is stronger when the proposal emphasizes the

importance of meeting the criteria for EU membership. The strategic decision to express greater support for gender equality in order to achieve membership does not suggest that one personally perceives gender equality as a more valid policy (the 'right' thing to do). Therefore, I include whether or not EU membership is certain in the future as a treatment. I can prime certainty over membership in the minds of the respondents, which reduces the likelihood that they will respond strategically and increase support for gender equality just because EU membership is at stake.

This prime allows me to better understand whether the EU criteria promote strategic thinking, or whether EU rules enhance the validity of gender equality in people's minds. Essentially, if respondents think that EU membership is "a lock" then they should not respond as strategically (supporting gender equality in order to achieve membership). Hence, I could better distinguish the increased prescriptive validity of EU rules from one providing more support to gender equality because membership is at stake. If respondents' support for gender equality increases even when they are told membership is certain, I would have evidence of a deeper influence from the EU in people's decision-making when considering gender. Moreover, there is some degree of foreknowledge about the gender equality criteria that should be expected among the population. This prime can mitigate this 'pre-treatment' by suggesting that the criteria issue is less important for eventual membership in one experimental group and more important in another experimental group (mitigating the diff between those with and without prior knowledge). For the dependent variable, in the first study, I measure not only support for gender equality with one measure, but instead a twenty five point measure based on questions regarding 1) support for equal pay, 2) one's likelihood to

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vote for parties that support for equal pay, 3) and one's likelihood to pay higher taxes to achieve equal pay.

For the second survey, I take a different approach to unpack the effects from the EU's involvement in human rights policies. I examine how the EU labelling given to criteria issues like women's rights and gay rights triggers biases among respondents with regards to their preferences for EU membership. Previously, I examined the effect of the EU on support for women's rights (in different ways, such as voting behavior and willingness to pay taxes), but biases not only have consequences for direct support. They also have important implications for who individuals blame for policy outcomes, such as the level of discrimination in society. People blame and absolve politicians and institutions in ways that reflect their predispositions. Moreover, citizens in applicant states like Bosnia and Herzegovina live in conditions where women and gay people face discrimination at higher levels in comparison to other European countries. In terms of addressing policy concerns of the EU, providing information about conditions on the ground should collide with people's predispositions about EU membership, where opponents of independence do not want their government to have to bear the responsibility of addressing policy outcomes that would align their country with the EU. If responsibility assignment is affected by the EU level, this should lead to further effects on opinions about women's rights and gay rights, because if one feels that the government should not address an issue; then one's support for the issue is likely to decrease as well.

1.2 SURVEY METHOD

I plan to use population-based survey experiments to study public attitudes in EU candidate states (Mutz 2011). These experiments entail researchers "using survey sampling to produce a collection of experimental subjects that is representative of the target population of interest for a particular theory" (a country, region, or social group, for instances) (Mutz 2011, 2). The surveys are performed with a theoretically motivated sample (nationally representative samples of populaces in an EU applicant states) (Morton and Williams 2010, 260). While conventional surveys and existing data (such as the Eurobarometer and the World Values Survey) allow me to ascertain the association between supporting EU membership and supporting the accession criteria, they would not allow me to know if EU membership spurs individuals to ascribe more support and importance to issues connected to EU accession (changing their attitudes to conform to EU criteria) (Gaxie 2011, 11). Essentially, I want to know how EU candidate state populations respond to policies framed as advancing the state's bid for EU membership, so I sample from a population represented by a government that is trying to join. The respondents in a survey experiment are assigned randomly to control groups and treatment groups that produce variation in the explanatory variables (Mutz 2011, 2). Here, I manipulate whether or not an issue area is tied to EU membership in a public debate, and whether or not membership seems guaranteed or tied to conditions. This dissertation includes two surveys, and the chapters that follow elaborate upon their research design, and these designs are further described below in the chapter descriptions.

1.3 CASE SELECTION

      I will use survey sampling "to produce a collection of experimental subjects that is representative of the target population of interest for a particular theory" (a country, region, or social group, for instance) (Mutz 2011, 2). I want to know how citizens in countries aspiring to join the EU respond to policies framed as advancing the state's bid for EU membership, so I plan collect a representative population sample from an aspiring state (Morton and Williams 2010, 390). I made my case selection based on available data and characteristics of the diverse regions of the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a context where my contentions can be readily tested.

      First, fourteen governments are in the country (the state, two entities, ten cantons, and one independent district) creating multiple constituencies to examine. Second, support for European Union accession varies considerably across the governing bodies (the entities), pro- viding me leverage for distinguishing between constituency opinion on EU membership and constituency opinion on the EU conditions (such as gender equality) (NDI 2009). According to the NDI (2009) survey, 74% of respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina completely support accession to the EU, compared to 40% of respondents in the Republika Srpska (18% somewhat supported accession in FBiH while 43% somewhat supported acces- sion the RS). The difference in public opinion creates hypothetical expectations that can be confirmed or refuted by the survey (EU aspirations more influential in the FBiH when compared to the RS). Due to the multi-national governmental arrangement of BiH, my sur- vey experiment will be cross-national between the Serb controlled RS and the Bosnian and Croat controlled FBiH. It also will be cross-national in terms of the three nationalities living throughout these governing

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entities. Hence, I can test my hypotheses among diverse groups in diverse governmental contexts (see also Tomz and Weeks 2013).

Because gender equality and gay rights are issues that (although a requirement for membership) have received limited commitments from candidate governments and the EU, I expect that citizens are less likely to draw a connection between the gender equality and gay rights and the EU (the topic of the experimental vignettes) without prompting. Gender equality and gay rights are distinguishable from other issue areas like ease of travel to EU countries and the institutional balance between Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats which are more likely to spur a connection to EU membership in the minds of respondents. Therefore, for gender equality and gay rights, I can more credibly cue the salience of this issue for EU membership advancement (respondents are less likely to be 'pre-treated' through their previous experiences) (Gaines and Kuklinski 2011, 456). The data elaborated upon in the following chapters show that the correlation between these rights policies and support for EU membership, is indeed low.

In the following sections, I describe the contents of the three empirical chapters of the dissertation, including the argument and findings.

1.4 DOES THE CARROT ON THE STICK WORK?

In the first empirical chapter, I examine the effects from the EU establishing conditions of membership on applicant countries, because the European Union has a problem. The EU's policy standards ask all applicant states to promote equal treatment in the workplace, including equal-pay-for-equal-work between women and men. However, across recent and current candidacies, implementation and commitment to gender equality has been sporadic and inconsistent. Despite a 2003 gender equality law

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in Bosnia and Herzegovina, discrimination on the basis of gender remains an everyday reality, including workplace harassment, limited maternity rights, and unfair hiring. Existing research shows that the EU's standards for membership helped to lead governments to change their laws to match successfully, but we do not know whether the EU's standards affect normative commitments to women's rights.

In 2012, around one thousand women marched in protest of gender inequality and discrimination in Sarajevo. Are people's attitudes toward gender equality affected when the EU emphasizes this issue as a criterion for membership? Do opponents of gender equality express more favorable opinions about women's rights when the EU promotes its criteria for membership? This question is important because the EU strives to change states' policies. For instance, in 2015 EU foreign ministers told Bosnia and Herzegovina that "meaningful progress on the implementation of [the] agenda for reforms will be necessary for a membership application to be considered by the European Union", and "tangible results will be fundamental for the Council to consider a membership application in the future". However, the EU has been criticized for years for acting against what citizens want (part of the EU's democratic deficit).
What the EU should hope is that attitudes change when it prescribes policies, because this would promote values like gender equality and enhance its legitimacy. Ideally, the EU's involvement in domestic politics reduces objections to items on the reform agenda, such as women's rights standards, and does not exacerbate objections.

Existing studies suggest the messages from EU officials do not affect opinion formation and that EU issues are secondary to national issues, but we do not know how the public responds to the EU's demand for reforms, dangling potential membership like

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a 'carrot on a stick' (Hix and Marsh, 2007; Hix and March, 2011; Schmitt, 2005; de Vreese et al., 2006; Hobolt et al., 2013). I argue that the economic enticement of EU membership influences the general population. The population is split into people who already agree with the principles behind EU standards and those who do not agree. These opponents are an impediment to normative commitment to EU standards, and a key group of interest in this study. I expect that EU standards move public opinion among the opponents of gender equality, when they believe in the economic benefit of membership. Individuals subjectively perceive benefits to the domestic economy from joining the EU. Examples include access to a greater variety of goods, ease of travel, and the EU's structural funds.

In the EU accession process, the EU applies conditionality on candidates, where meeting the criteria for membership is necessary to join. Hence, the EU's enticements can be represented by the 'carrot on the stick' analogy where meeting standards leads to the 'carrot' of membership. Among those who believe in the EU's economic benefits, I expect that the EU's emphasis on gender equality has a larger effect when they believe that meeting the standards leads to membership, in comparison to when they believe that EU membership is guaranteed. Put another way, when one believes that EU membership is guaranteed, one can gain the benefits of membership without adopting the criteria.

In this chapter I gauge public support for women's rights. To know if the prospect of EU membership influences opinions, I need to conduct an experiment which randomly assigns respondents to experimental groups which receive messages concerning a equal pay for equal work policy proposal within a public debate among civil society groups. For the first treatment, I manipulate whether or not the equal pay

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proposal is addressed as advancing a bid for EU membership in a public debate

(Emphasis Treatment). For the second treatment, I manipulate whether or not meeting

the membership criteria is addressed as important for achieving membership, as told by a

European Union official: either guaranteeing membership (Certainty Treatment) or

saying that meeting the criteria is important. The dependent variable is support for the

equal pay proposal, and this is a composite measure with three survey items regarding 1)

support for the proposal, 2) vote choice if a party supported the proposal, and 3) one's

willingness to pay higher taxes to implement the proposal (each are five point scales).

When membership is guaranteed, the EU's emphasis message produces a stronger

increase in support for gender equality among those who do not support equal pay

between women and men. I find that the EU's political messages emphasizing that EU

membership is guaranteed and gender equality as a standard for membership move

opinions in favor of gender equality standards when opponents of gender equality

perceive benefits from membership. These results suggest that the EU needs to make the

benefits of membership apparent and achievable in order to affect opinions on gender

equality.

1.5 HOW CITIZENS REACT TO THE EU'S HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS

In the second empirical chapter, I examine how the EU standards for membership

are triggering biases in Bosnia. Adopting EU human rights standards is useful for

ensuring democratic values in states applying for EU membership. EU standards limit

opportunities for governments to renege on their human rights commitments due to

changes in their domestic politics (Moravcsik 2000; 2002). On the other hand, the EU's

involvement in human rights can lead to contentious politics, as evidenced by the

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backlash against gay rights in Poland after the EU pressured the parliament to pass workplace anti-discrimination laws in order to gain membership in 2004 (O'Dwyer 2013; Kochenov 2007; O'Dwyer and Schwartz 2010). Warsaw banned Pride parades in 2004 and 2005, after hosting parades in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Education minister Roman Giertych proposed legislation to prevent 'homosexual propaganda' from being taught in schools in 2007. Complying with the EU's human rights standards is an important public debate in applicant states, especially for marginalized groups like women and gay people. In applicant states, EU officials engage the public with civil society dialogues. These meetings elicit feedback from citizens about proposed policy changes and outline how the adoption of EU standards is the price of EU membership (Roth, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2010; European Commission, 2005; 2008). The EU's goal is "giving everyone a voice in EU enlargement", after the 2004 enlargement was criticized for involving reform processes where citizens were neither informed nor prepared (European Commission 2005; 2008; Montoya 2013, 146).

However, research on European public opinion does not examine opinions among applicant state citizens who prefer their state's independence from the EU, and it does not gauge these citizens' responses to the EU's human rights agenda. The established consensus is that citizens are disinterested with the EU, and do not respond to information provided by the EU, but we do not know what happens when the EU's rights agenda confronts citizens' predispositions about EU membership (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix and Marsh 2007; Hix and Marsh 2011; Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Weber 2011; de Vreese et al. 2006; Hobolt and Tilley 2013). These omissions have major

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ramifications for marginalized groups, because the EU's attempts to modify an applicant state's human rights may lead citizens to reject human rights.

Existing studies show that informational short-cuts are a key component of political behavior in competitive democracies, because affiliations like one's partisanship affect how one perceives policies, and the institutions one blames for the condition of those policies, when they are associated with different parties (partisan bias) (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Brader and Tucker 2009; Tilley and Hobolt 2011; Druckman et al. 2013). I argue that supporters of state independence and supporters of integration with the EU comprise 'partisan' groups with opposing interests in the political conflict regarding integration, sharing policy control between states. Scholars have given little attention to the opinions of people who desire their state's independence, despite their growing importance given the referendum on the UK's EU membership, the rise of anti-EU parties, and referenda to join the EU in applicant states.

A key component of the EU's rights agenda has been to remove "irrational limitations" on free markets throughout Europe (Duina 1999). Hence, a longstanding EU policy has been helping the female labor force by promoting equal pay between women and men (Duina 1999). In recent years, the EU has helped gay people in the labor force by promoting equal treatment in the workplace (preventing unfair hiring and firing practices, for instance). Following my argument, the EU's promotion of women's rights and gay rights provides a cue for citizens which helps them decide whether these policies match their interests. I expect people who prefer their state's independence to feel less supportive of rights when they are told rights advance their state's integration with the EU (an EU framing of rights), in comparison to EU supporters.

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Among those told that rights advance integration, I expect that independence supporters are more likely to absolve their government of blame for bad conditions regarding rights, in comparison to EU supporters. Furthermore, a comparison between human rights is important because different rights can pertain to groups that have different levels of marginalization in society. Political institutions at the national and European levels have been more deeply involved in women's rights in comparison to the newer, more controversial gay rights. Homophobic discrimination in society often goes unchallenged by government action. If women's rights are perceived as an appropriate responsibility of political institutions in comparison to gay rights, then the EU should more credibly signal that women's rights advance a state's integration with the EU, in comparison to gay rights. These expectations suggest that the EU possesses a greater influence on public opinion than the established consensus presumes, because citizens would have the capacity to object to rights based on their interests regarding independence from the EU.

Joining the EU involves shifting policy control to the supranational level, and the political choice to remain more independent or integrate with the community of EU states. In the EU accession process, national independence is the incumbent condition, and European integration alters this status quo. Governments pass rights legislation in order to meet the EU's requirements for membership, which strive to establish a unified system of anti-discrimination rules throughout Europe. However, normative commitment to rights among leaders and citizens remains weak, and these issues require greater public support in order for implementation to succeed (Falkner et al. 2005; Avdeyeva 2010).

Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a theoretically-appropriate case, because it is divided into two autonomous, governing regions; which are relevant for my expectations regarding the assignment of blame for human rights problems. The two regions, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS), possess low and high levels of institutional clarity. The FBiH is ruled by ten cantons (each with a parliament) as well as an overall FBiH parliament, while the RS is ruled by one unified parliament. Citizens have a more difficult time assigning responsibility for policy outcomes to institutions in contexts with low levels of institutional clarity. With lower levels of institutional clarity, citizens rely more on biases when assigning responsibility for policy outcomes (Tilley and Hobolt 2011, 13). Biases elicited by experimental frames should be stronger in the FBiH (where clarity is murkier) in comparison to the RS. From this case selection, we can gather data on citizens who theoretically have more or less difficulty assigning responsibility to political institutions for policy outcomes.

I find mixed evidence in favor of the argument that the EU serves as a cue for applicant state citizens. The EU framing of equal pay (by itself) did not move opinions among independence or EU supporters. However, among those who are told that equal pay advances integration, I find that independence supporters are more likely to absolve their government of blame for rights, in comparison to EU supporters, when given information about bad conditions regarding rights. Moreover, I find that this decrease in blame for the government leads independence supporters to offer less support for political parties which support equal pay, in comparison to EU supporters. Hence, the EU frame can move opinions about equal pay to the extent that citizens blame their government for bad conditions regarding inequality in pay. These results were stronger in the Federation

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of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in comparison to the Republika Srpska. On the other hand, the EU framing of the equal treatment of gay people or bad conditions in Bosnia regarding the treatment of gay people did not move opinions. The implications of the findings are discussed in the chapter.

1.6 LEGITIMACY FOR THE EU'S GAY RIGHTS STANDARDS

From the data in the previous chapter, gay rights are revealed to be much less popular in comparison to women's rights, suggesting that gay people face a more marginalized status in Bosnia. Hence, gay people have especially high stakes in the EU's governance pertaining to human rights issues. Hence, in the third empirical chapter, I unpack the attitudes towards the EU's involvement in gay rights among those who identify with gay people. A growing body of scholarly research shows that international and regional institutions lack the public legitimacy that is often necessary to address human rights adequately (Hafner-Burton 2014; Pegram 2010; Hathaway 2002; 2007; Falkner et al. 2006). The European Union, often touted as a powerful regional institution, has taken up the monitoring, standard-setting, and enforcement of human rights principles throughout its member states. As the EU expands its membership, EU officials require applicant states to adopt their human rights standards. However, in practice, human rights standards are often window dressing in the applicant states, where normative commitments to rights are weak (Falkner et al 2008; Avdeyeva 2010). Governments pass the laws required by the EU, but they do not invest the resources to adequately implement the laws. Ostensibly weak commitments to human rights provide a puzzle for scholars and policymakers: if EU human rights standards have minimal consequences, then what would explain support for giving powers concerning human

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rights to the EU? This puzzle has major ramifications for marginalized people because it suggests that rights are less effective if they are governed by the EU.

Existing research on the adoption of human rights regimes often focuses on bargaining among governments regarding human rights agreements, and public opinion studies focus on citizens' recognition of human rights violations (Moravcsik 2000; McFarland and Mathews 2005; Hafner-Burton 2008; Davis et al. 2012). What the existing research misses is a comparison of opinions among the stakeholders of human rights: people who associate with marginalized peoples affected by human rights policies, and people who disassociate with the affected groups. In particular, state institutions produce the marginalized status of gay people via political homophobia (for instances, national identities defined in opposition to homosexuality, and laws which privilege heterosexual relationships) (Canaday 2009; Bernstein et al 2009; Bosia and Weiss 2013). Hence, human rights abuses can stem centrally from state institutions, which marginalizes people within populations (Hafner-Burton 2014). I expect that those who identify more closely with gay people are more likely to support transferring control of gay rights to the EU.

In this chapter I gauge public support for the transfer of authority over gay rights policies to the European Union. The analysis is based on an original survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country applying for EU membership. Bosnia is a theoretically appropriate case because applicant states face the political choice of submitting to the authority of EU institutions with regards to human rights policies (the potential of new EU legislation regarding rights, with which politicians and voters may agree or disagree). Homophobia is acute in Bosnia in comparison to other European states, so gay people

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have a high stake in the antidiscrimination policies prescribed by the EU (ILGA-Europe 2013; Human Rights Watch 2014). Furthermore, the Bosnian state is cross national with two governing regions (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska) so a representative sample of Bosnia allows me to test the robustness of the hypotheses across two distinct national contexts. I operationalize identification with gay people by asking respondents how closely (or not) they associate with the ideas and values subjectively ascribed to gay people.

I find that closer identification with gay people associates with greater support for transferring control of gay rights to the EU. On the other hand, the effects of trusting the EU on support for EU control of gay rights were not substantially larger among those who closely associate with gay people. As a further test of the argument, I examine whether dissatisfaction with the government produces greater support for political parties espousing human rights for gay people. Satisfaction with governing institutions should be a more important consideration when those who feel close to gay people decide on their support for gay rights-friendly parties. The effects of government dissatisfaction on support for gay-friendly parties were larger among those who closely associate with gay people, in comparison to those who do not associate with gay people. As robustness check, I estimated the models which treated support for transferring control of women's rights as the dependent variable, which theoretically should not associate as strongly with one's feelings of closeness to gay people. One's association with gay people does not correlate with this women's right variable; suggesting that the interests of gay people are specified towards the EU's control of gay rights as opposed to EU control of domestic policies generally. Overall, this study sets out a normative challenge for the EU to

provide (material and informational) assistance to gay citizens: helping marginalized people who exhibit greater support for the EU's governance.

1.7 CONCLUSIONS

This project seeks to explain the influence of the EU accession process on public attitudes in the candidate states. While much of the existing studies focus on the influence of domestic political attitudes on support of European integration, this project contributes to political science research by studying the influences of the EU on the domestic political attitudes. Moreover, while previous research has focused on shared beliefs between individuals and the EU policies, I assess the EU's normative pull in the minds of citizens.

This project also explores the influence of EU criteria on the importance that citizens ascribe to gender equality. EU accession may change candidate government's domestic political context by shaping public attitudes towards EU policies. This project also contributes to gender studies by identifying conditions that can lead a populace to deepen its support for gender equality. The EU criteria may become focal points around which constituencies can mobilize for/against policy positions; potentially increasing the government's electoral costs of keeping the status quo. Hence, the EU's leverage in its enlargement process may be contingent upon mass political sentiments. The project methodologically contributes to EU research and EU enlargement studies by using population-based survey experiments in order to assess attitudes of citizens. This project also points out the need for the EU to be more directly involved in helping women and gay people in the form of resources (information, counselling, shelters), because the EU may lead to a more negative impression on some people. Hence, the EU needs to actively

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help marginalized people with its funds, and also promote rights as for and by the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not as a method to make people more "European" or acceptable to Western Europe.

CHAPTER 2

DOES THE "CARROT ON THE STICK" WORK? HOW THE CRITERIA FOR EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP AFFECT SUPPORT FOR GENDER EQUALITY

The European Union establishes equal pay for equal work between women and men as a criterion for applicant states that are trying to join. Conventional wisdom holds that governments meet these criteria in order to gain perceived benefits of membership. Existing research also holds that legal changes to meet the EU's criteria have not been followed by normative commitments to women's rights in the applicant states. These studies do not gauge the public's response to gender equality when it is framed as a criteria, where advancing gender equality is necessary for EU membership. The accession process entails states trying to join the European Union. Ostensibly, this political process has special aspects that need to be unpacked if we are to understand the environment in which opinions are forming. The EU sets up conditions for membership, and applicant states choose to comply, to some extent. The EU dangles a "carrot on a stick" in terms of the government's perceived benefits of membership (the government has to pass legislation in order to become a member), and the voters who support or oppose governments and EU accession. Within the minds of all the players, there is some degree of uncertainty over membership and the uncertainty over the importance of complying with the standards. The aforementioned factors may be consequential for the

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EU's policy standards like gender equality which have tremendous implications for people's day to day lives. Do these policy standards, the "stick", and the uncertainty over standards help move opponents of gender equality in favor of the standards, or is the EU antagonizing these opponents?

2.1 THE EUROPEAN UNION, GENDER EQUALITY, AND ENLARGEMENT

Public opinion studies of gender equality often share the goal of uncovering the predispositions that lead people to exhibit greater support for women's rights (see Burns and Gallagher, 2010). Existing public opinion research suggests that women's sense of interdependence with other women (group consciousness) associates with greater support for gender equality (Sears and Huddy, 1986; Conover, 1988; Rhodebeck, 1996). Conover (1988) shows that interdependence increases support for equal pay, affirmative action for women, and government intervention on behalf of women. Among men, Sapiro and Conover (2001) find that belief in gender equality within the family increases support for a gender neutral draft. Rhodebeck (1996) finds that feelings of closeness towards women as a group increase one's belief in equal roles between women and men. Other studies suggest that partisanship and ideology associate with increased support for gender issues (Sulfaro 2007).

The aforementioned studies explain support for gender equality with personal and intra- national variables. However, international political forces have become more influential in women's rights. Over the past few decades, international agreements concerning women's rights have proliferated and they created new bodies of law and institutions which ostensibly address gender equality. Examples include the United Nation's Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

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(CEDAW) and the EU's regulations regarding equal treatment between women and men in the workplace, as well as promoting of protections against domestic violence (Avdeyeva 2010; Weldon 2006; Montoya 2013). What remains unexplored is whether international agreements concerning gender equality influence people's attitudes and behavior pertaining to women's rights. The goal of these agreements is improving the lives of women. Hence, the ramifications of adopting these agreements on the opinions of citizens needs exploration. International and regional institutions should hope that citizens agree (or became agreeable) with their conventions and treaties.

The enlargement of the European Union provides a context where one can study the EU's normative pull on domestic constituencies regarding gender equality rules. The EU has developed one of the strongest gender equality regimes in the world. When countries join the EU, they must incorporate a series of gender equality rules into their national legislation, which are promoted in terms of EU membership by European Commission officials (who monitor candidate state progress) and civil society groups.

The decision by governments to enter the EU accession process and adopt policies introduces new ideas and commitments in domestic politics. Complying with the EU is an important public debate in applicant states, especially in terms of compliance with human rights principles like gender equality. In applicant states, EU officials engage the public with civil society dialogues. EU officials, government officials, civil society groups elicit feedback from citizens about proposed policy changes and outline how the adoption of EU standards is the price of EU membership (Roth, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2010; European Commission, 2005; 2008). The EU's goal is "giving everyone a voice in EU enlargement", after the 2004 enlargement was criticized for

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involving reform processes where citizens were neither informed nor prepared (European Commission 2005; 2008). But what do citizens in applicant states think about EU enlargement?

Public opinion studies on EU enlargement indicate that one's wealth and education level increase one's favorability towards the EU (see Szcerbiak 2001). In Turkey, Carkoglu (2003) finds that increased education, leftist sentiments, and the electoral fragmentation (more competing parties) associate with European integration support; while strong religious sentiments associate with decreased support for European integration. For post-Communist countries, Tucker et al. (2002) suggest that free market supporters, the 'winners' of integration, are more likely to support EU membership.

Existing studies also show the strong influence of subjective national problems on opinion formation concerning the EU. Sanchez-Cuenca's (2000) analysis of the Eurobarometer indicates negative opinions towards national political system and positive opinions towards supranational institutions translate into support for European integration. Other scholars examine how domestic political sentiments like partisanship, support for incumbents, and satisfaction with the government influence attitudes on European integration (Gabel, 1998a; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Kritzinger, 2003). Kritzinger (2003) argues that support for the EU results from perceptions of national problems, and McLaren (2007) indicates that perception of cultural threats in the national context explains hostility towards the European Union (hostility towards multiculturalism). Ehin's (2001) public opinion research on Central and Eastern Europe indicates that publics hold various levels of support for the European Union, and that

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opinions on the EU are wrapped up in support and opposition for the national government.

However, the question of whether the EU changes people's perception of domestic problems is unclear. As the EU grows more and more influential in people's lives, we do not know the EU's influence on people's opinions on issues like gender equality. Montoya (2013) in *From Global to Grassroots* provides a foundational study on the normative impact of the European Union by examining efforts to combat domestic violence in Central and Eastern Europe. Montoya shows that normative measures matter in changing policies on domestic violence. Human rights frames of domestic violence, espoused by EU officials, helped disseminate policies in CEE countries. The framing of domestic violence in terms of the EU (especially from EU officials lobbying and discussing reforms with government officials) promoted normative commitment among state officials. Montoya (2013) contends that policies need to move beyond rhetoric, assess state and local implementation capacities, commit to reforms (with necessary resources), and incorporate perspectives from the grassroots (251-252). Obstacles to these goals include public attitudes on gender equality and domestic violence (250). A normative commitment from the populace is important for improving chances of implementation, alongside the legal commitment of state leaders.

Maier and Rittberger (2008) examine opinion formation about EU enlargement while framing issues in terms of a cultural match with EU countries. They test competing explanations for support for EU enlargement, including economic, democracy, and cultural identity. In their experiment with students at the University of Kaiserslautern, Maier and Rittberger (2008) prime a cultural mismatch by emphasizing cultural

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difference between the European Union and Macedonia before asking the respondents whether they would support Macedonian EU membership. The cultural mismatch prime produced the largest negative effect among their results. Their research suggest that subjective cultural identity influences the attitudes of Europeans towards expanding EU membership. However, what is missing in the study of EU enlargement is research into whether the EU's conditions influence people in applicant states. he EU also aspires to promote normative commitment among leaders and the public. None of the aforementioned studies empirically test whether citizens express attitudes about gender equality differently when they consider the EU's standards for membership. Does the prospect of EU membership influences the ways that people in aspiring members think about policies such as gender equality? Does the EU's sponsorship of reform move people's opinions on gender equality when people perceive benefits from the EU? Existing research does not present evidence about whether the EU is a consideration for beneficiaries from membership when they form their opinions.

2.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The European Union applies conditionality to governments that aspire to join. EU membership is conditional upon these governments passing legislation in order to align their legal framework with EU. Hence, the incentives of membership motivate governments to comply with the EU's conditions (Vachudova 2005). The EU uses the potential benefits of membership as leverage to promote reform (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The transposition of gender equality laws has been successful, and the European Commission has approved social policies in the membership negotiations despite inconsistent implementation (Avdeyeva 2007; 2010).

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European Union faces a lack of cooperation with EU rules. The EU is external institution, and has leverage over applicant governments that desire EU membership because the governments see benefits in joining. Hence, the EU can sanction when it puts up roadblocks on the path to achieving the perceived benefits of membership. Figuring out the public's reaction to the EU's conditions is important, because EU ministers and the European Commission demand reforms as the price of membership. This 'carrot on the stick' approach to reform has yielded effective legal change, but we do not know whether the approach influences citizens' opinions on the rules the EU tries to promote (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The EU lacks the legitimacy often associated with the domestic institutions that prescribe policies. Without an electoral connection with the public or the credibility of sanctioning powers reflected in domestic institutions, cooperation with standards may be less likely (Dal Bo et al 2010). The EU possesses some leverage over the behavior of governments to the extent that people in applicant states feel that the EU will provide benefits. Those who perceive benefits from EU membership should respond more favorably to the EU's criteria, in comparison to those who do not. EU officials should hope that they help the causes they promote and not hurt them.

> H1: Citizens who perceive economic benefits from EU membership are
> more likely to support gender equality, when they are told that gender
> equality is a criteria for EU membership.

The previous arguments suggested that the motivation to align one's view with the EU lay in one's potential gains: benefits from membership and a better political system. They did not indicate that the values regarding gender equality would shift, among those

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who oppose gender equality. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier put it, the EU's values resonate in the domestic context.

Individuals can share common values (or not) with the EU's standards for membership. Attitudes about the EU's criteria like gender equality establishes "the stick" in one's mind, where one sees a path to the EU's benefits by expressing pro-gender equality attitudes that pressure government to meet the criteria of membership. Individuals who perceive benefits from EU membership (in other words, those who perceive the "carrot on the stick" tactic), are the main stakeholders in the connection between gender equality and EU membership. Hence, those of key theoretical concern for this project are individuals who see the "carrot" (the benefits of EU membership), and feel they may need to conform their expressed attitudes to the EU standards. Among them, people who disagree with gender equality principles are more likely to perceive "the stick". Those who perceive benefits and are opponents of gender equality should perceive the conditionality, and respond positively to gender equality, aligning themselves with a policy that advances EU membership.

H2: Citizens who 1) disagree with gender equality principles and 2) perceive economic benefits from EU membership are more likely to support gender equality, when they are told that gender equality is a criteria for EU membership.

2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to test the hypotheses, I use data from an original survey conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2015 with a representative sample of 997 respondents. The nationally representative sample of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recruited by *Ipsos*.

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The sample includes 997 adults (18+). The response rate was 64 percent. *Ipsos* uses random iterative weighting (RIM) in order to offset sampling biases with regards to sex, age, ethnicity, and rural/urban settlements.The survey consisted of face-to-face, computer-assisted interviews. The survey was carried out in Bosnia, which is a state trying to join the EU. Bosnia is a theoretically appropriate case because its citizens and leaders face the political choice to try to join the EU (or not) and share control over domestic policies with the EU.

In the survey experiment, the sample of Bosnian citizens were randomly assigned to a treatment group and a control groups, described below. The experimental manipulation is a media statement (or vignette) about a public debate in Bosnia. In the vignettes, I use gender equality as the issue of the public debate (equal pay for equal work, a criterion for EU membership). In the hypothetical media statements, civil society groups propose that the state trains more labor inspectors who can help enforce equal pay between men and women (see the Appendix for exact wording).

Gender equality issues are included in the accession process in a number of ways. Schwellnus (2005) argues that "nondiscrimination can be regarded a clear and well established norm at the EU level" (55). The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) empowered the EU to "take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation" (Schwellnus 2005, 55). The EU laws that candidates need to transpose include: directives on equal pay, equal treatment in the workplace, equal treatment with regard to statutory social security schemes and occupational social security schemes, equal treatment for self-employed and their assisting spouses, protection of pregnant workers, organization of working time,

parental leave, burden of proof in sex discrimination cases, and part-time work (Galligan, Clavero and Calloni 2007).

The European Commission's progress reports on the candidate states of the 2004/2007 enlargements suggest that the implementation of gender equality policy was not a credible condition for membership, because implementation was scant across the countries that still became members (some degree of legislative enactment was enough for the European Commission) (Falkner and Treib 2008). According to Avdeyeva (2010), EU candidates theoretically have faced similar EU incentives and potential punishment, and "we find variation in the levels of their domestic legislative and institutional reform" (205).

Because gender equality is an issue that (although a requirement for membership) has received limited commitments from candidate governments and the EU, I expect that citizens are less likely to draw a connection between the gender equality and the EU (the topic of the experimental vignettes) without prompting. I find the expected weak association between opinions about equal pay and perceptions of EU benefits (see Table 1). Therefore, for gender equality, I can more credibly cue the salience of this issue for EU membership advancement (respondents are less likely to be 'pre-treated' through their previous experiences) (Gaines and Kuklinski 2011, 456).

For treatments in this experiment, I use the newspaper article vignettes, which discuss a gender equality criterion, equal-pay-for-equal-work, in a public debate. A proposal for promoting equal-pay-for-work is made by the participants in the debate. The design has four experimental groups and two treatments. For the first treatment, I manipulate whether or not the equal pay proposal is addressed as advancing a bid for EU

membership in a public debate (Emphasis Treatment). For the second treatment, I manipulate whether or not meeting the membership criteria is important for achieving membership, as suggested by a European Union official: either guaranteeing membership (Certainty Treatment) or saying that meeting the criteria is important (see the wording in the Appendix). The difference in equal pay support between 1) those who are primed to think they will get into the EU and 2) those who are primed to think there are hoops to jump through in order to gain membership represents the "conditionality effect".

The dependent variable is support for the equal pay proposal, and this is a additive measure with three survey items regarding 1) support for the proposal, 2) vote choice if a party supported the proposal, and 3) one's willingness to pay higher taxes to implement the proposal (each are measured on a zero to four scale). For the support measure, 58 percent of the respondents supported the proposal ('Strongly supported' or 'Supported' on the 5 point scale). For the vote choice measure, 42 percent of the respondents were likely to vote for the party ('Much more likely' or 'Somewhat more likely' on the 5 point scale). For the taxes measure, 20 percent of the respondents were willing to pay more taxes to achieve the proposal ('Very willing' or 'Willing to some extent' on the 5 point scale). The additive score is measured on a scale of zero to twelve (twelve represents those who are very supportive of equal pay). The score has a mean of 6.8 and a standard deviation of 2.2 (the modal category is six with 23 percent of the respondents). I have two experimental treatments, creating a "two by two design", so I have an interaction effect in the statistical models to represent those who received both treatments. I expect that these effects are conditional upon respondent characteristics, such as support for

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gender equality, so I asked a set of survey items before the treatment. The order of these questions was randomized for the respondents in order to alleviate priming effects. I created triple interactions in these models. The triple interaction includes the two treatments and perceiving economic benefits, measured with a dummy variable with "one" representing those who think that benefits are unlikely or somewhat unlikely (59 percent of the respondents) and "zero" representing those who think that benefits are likely or somewhat likely (41 percent of the respondents). For hypothesis two, opposition to equal pay is measured with a dummy variable with "one" representing those who strongly agree or agree with the idea that men should be paid more than women for the same job (7 percent of the respondents) and "zero" representing those who strongly disagree or disagree with this idea (93 percent of the respondents).

2.4 RESULTS

I first examine the association between belief in economic benefits from EU membership with policy evaluations of equal pay between women and men. These associations may suggest that those who perceive benefits from the EU exhibit different levels of support for equal pay for equal work. The data indicate that there is not a strong correlation between the variables of interest. Table 1 shows the percentage of believers in more pay for men is close to the percentage of believers among those who disagree with idea that men should be paid more.

The different groups for equal pay evaluations and attributions had similar scores, regardless of their status as a believer in men's higher pay. These results suggest that there is not a 'consensus view' on how gender equality opinions relate to one's perception of the EU as benefiting one's economy. A large majority of citizens disagree

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with the idea that men should receive higher pay, but the minority of citizens who agree with this idea present an impediment to gender equality principles (their responses to the EU's criteria may be consequential to the implementation of gender equality policies).

Tables 1 illustrates the possible ways in which EU economic benefit perceptions and gender equality opinions are correlated. However, the causal order of the variables is not clear. The experiment tests whether an EU frame and a frame regarding certainty over EU membership informs the evaluation of gender equality policies. I then observe how this treatment affects evaluations of gender equality by one's perception that the EU provides economic benefits. The expectation is that if believers in EU benefits are told an issue is condition for EU membership, they will have more positive evaluations, in comparison to those who do not belief in benefits. Table 2 shows the results, with an OLS regression predicting evaluations of equal pay (on a 0-12 point scale, with 12 representing a very positive evaluation), with explanatory variables for the treatments and EU benefit preference (dummy indicating belief in EU benefits), and an interaction between the treatments and EU benefits perceptions.

Table 2 presents the results of the statistical model for the influence of the EU emphasis and certainty treatments by one's belief in the benefits of joining the EU. Table 2 shows an OLS regression predicting the evaluation on an equal pay proposal (on a 0-12 scale), with two independent dummy variables for the treatments (whether or not equal pay is framed as an EU condition, and whether or not the EU conditions is credible), a dummy variable for one's perception of benefits from the EU, and the interaction between the three. For interpretation of this triple interaction effect, Figure 1 shows the emphasis treatment effects (when the EU specifies an issue as advancing EU

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membership). Figure 1 illustrates the size of the treatment effects on evaluations of the equal pay proposals, among those who received the EU frame treatment (Figures 1 and 2 represent a three way interaction effect plot from the model in Table 2 – Figure 2 includes respondents who did not receive the EU frame treatment).

In the figures, we observe that the quantities of interest often are not distinguishable from one another at the traditional levels of statistical significance. Hence, my discussion of the results reflect the directions of the effect, although they are not strong. Among those who believe that EU membership is beneficial, and receive an EU emphasis on gender equality, they exhibit a higher level of support for gender equality when they are told that meeting criteria is necessary. Among those who believe that EU membership is not beneficial, and receive an EU emphasis on gender equality, they exhibit a lower level of support for gender equality when they are told that meeting criteria is necessary. Among those who believe in benefits, the positive effect from an EU emphasis is conditional upon one's belief that membership criteria are credible (as received by a cue from EU officials).

Moving to Figure 2, I examine the respondents' reactions to gender equality when it is not emphasized as a condition for EU membership. Among those who believe that EU membership is beneficial, and do not receive an EU emphasis on gender equality, they do not exhibit a higher level of support for gender equality when they are told that meeting criteria is necessary. Among those who believe that EU membership is not beneficial, and do not receive an EU emphasis on gender equality, they do not exhibit a lower level of support for gender equality when they are told that meeting criteria is necessary. Overall, among those who believe in benefits, the positive effect from an EU

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emphasis is conditional upon receiving information saying that EU membership is credible (as received by a cue from EU officials) *and* upon receiving a message saying that gender equality reforms advance EU membership.

These results suggest that the EU's conditionality has a polarizing effect among those with varying stakes for the benefits of EU membership. These results suggest that EU beneficiaries exhibit higher levels of support for the reform when it advances EU membership. Credible conditionality improves commitment to gender equality for those who believe in benefits, which suggests that their commitment is following the appeal of the EU. Credible conditionality decreases commitment to gender equality for those who do not believe in benefits, which suggests that the punitive nature of the 'carrot on the stick' perturbs those who do not believe in benefits.

However, the aforementioned analysis does not incorporate prior beliefs about gender equality which may shape perceptions of the equal pay proposal. Hence, I estimated another statistical model (Table 3) which broke up supporters and opponents of equal pay into those who perceive personal EU benefits and those who do not perceive personal EU benefits (four groups). The results indicate that those who oppose equal pay but perceive economic benefits from the EU do not exhibit higher levels of support for gender equality when they are told that advancing gender equality is necessary to join the EU. Hence, the results do not present evidence in favor of hypothesis two.

On the other hand, the results suggest that messages suggesting that eventual EU membership is certain influences those who oppose equal pay but perceive economic benefits from the EU (see Figure 3). When this groups receive the message saying the membership is certain (put another way, the conditions for membership are not credible),

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they exhibit lower levels of support for equal pay when they do not receive an EU emphasis. In other words, without an EU emphasis that ties the EU to gender equality and without credible conditionality, opponents of gender equality offer less support for gender equality.

In order to further test the effects from perceiving benefits, I examine the treatment effects among those who both oppose equal pay and believe that benefits from EU membership are unlikely. Those who oppose equal pay should perceive more of a "stick", because the EU is asking for policy changes with which they disagree. Those who do not believe in benefits from EU membership do not perceive the "carrot" of membership that theoretically appeals to those who believe in the benefits. Hence, those who oppose equal pay and do not believe in benefits should respond more negatively to the EU when conditionality is applied (asking an applicant country to jump through hoops), in comparison to those who oppose equal pay and believe in benefits. Without the "carrot", applying conditionality would be perceived as even more costly when someone disagrees with the issues behind the standards of membership. In order to substantiate whether believing in benefits matters, I replicate Figure 3 among those who do not believe in benefits and disagree with equal pay (see Figure 4). This group responds negatively (in terms of support for equal pay) to the EU emphasis treatment when they are told that meeting EU criteria are necessary for membership. Like those who believe in benefits and oppose equal pay, this group responds positively to the EU emphasis when they are told that EU membership is certain. This results suggests that when respondents are told EU membership is certain, an EU emphasis tends to have a positive effect on support for the equal pay proposal (when the enforcement of

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disagreeable policies is not primed). However, when respondents are told that meeting conditions of membership is necessary, those who do not believe in benefits and oppose equal pay respond more negatively to the EU emphasis (when potential costs are incurred from meeting conditions, without potential benefits from joining). Overall, these results suggest that the perception of benefits from membership matter when citizens form opinions about the gender equality issues promoted by the EU.

2.5 CONCLUSIONS

This study represents the first attempt to test the relationship between perceptions of economic benefits from the EU and support for the EU's gender equality agenda. My aim is to compare the different ways in which perceptions of economic EU benefits moderates the relationship between the EU's gender equality agenda and citizens' support for gender equality. This relationship is critical for the rights of women, because the EU's policy interventions may bolster or undermine citizens' support for women's rights. In order to examine these causal relationships, I conducted an innovative survey experiment which randomized whether gender equality was addressed as an EU policy and whether gender equality was a requirement for EU membership.

I examined two ways citizens can resolve the incongruity between their preferences for economic benefits from the EU and their personal opinions about gender equality. First, they can adjust their evaluations of the EU agenda to align with their belief in benefits from EU membership. Second, they can adjust their opinions about gender equality based on how credible they see the EU's conditions for membership. If they believe that their country will advance towards membership, with or without gender equality reforms, then they lack the incentive to adjust their preferences. On the other

hand, if they feel they must the criteria in order to join the EU, they may conform their views in order to advance their country towards membership.

The findings lend mixed support for these posits. The findings were not robust to traditional levels of statistical significance, but I did find that those who perceived benefits from the EU where less likely to support gender equality when they were told that EU membership was certain, and more likely to support gender equality when they were told that membership was conditional upon adopting gender equality. I unpacked this effect by examining support for equal pay by one's support for EU economic benefits. Those who believed in men's higher pay and benefits from EU membership were less likely to support equal pay policies when they are told that EU membership is certain and when they are not told that equal pay is an EU issue. The EU's rights agenda seems less appealing to opponents of gender equality who perceive benefits, when standards for membership are not presented as credible. By removing "the stick", and making the "carrot" attainable without compliance with EU standards, the opponents of gender equality who perceive benefits are more likely to take an anti-gender equality position.

This study makes three major contributions. First, existing research (showing an association between different attitudes and support for the EU) assumes that the EU matters for people, and that in some way, it can govern opinions when different issues are considered. However, another body of research shows that people are unresponsive to the EU, and consider EU issues to be secondary to national issues. This project suggests that the EU moves opinion, eliciting effects on expressed attitudes. People hold varying opinions about the EU and the issues at stake in the EU accession process, and they move

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their opinion based on their prior beliefs: more favorability towards gender equality when they perceive EU benefits and against gender equality when they do not perceive EU benefits.

Second, the politics of the EU accession process matter as well. Conditionality matters for those who perceive benefits from the EU. Opinions move towards EU equal pay policies when believers in benefits are told that these policies will fulfill the EU's requirements. Future studies can replicate this study over time in order to see whether the EU's interventions in policies has a lasting effect on public opinion. On the other hand, communicating the conditionality of EU policies to officials, lobbyists, or the public may have some counterproductive effects for the EU, where those who think benefits are unlikely may oppose EU standards.

On the other hand, perceiving a guaranteed pathway to membership, may undermine the credibility of the EU's rights agenda. In other words, without signals that indicate that standards are credible and necessary for membership, the opponents of gender equality (who are impediments to gender equality principles in society) may offer less support for the EU's equal pay policies, even if they think EU membership is beneficial. Future studies can unpack the effects of this perceived credibility by asking citizens whether they believe the government will follow the EU's standards. Moreover, citizens may hold more negative biases against the EU if they are told "they have to jump through hoops" (being asked to follow policies they dislike in order to achieve membership). Overall, the results suggest that the EU can be a divisive force in applicant countries, and EU officials should carefully consider its messaging in the EU accession process.

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Third, this project advances the scholarship on domestic support for international organizations by experimentally testing the influence of the EU on opinion formation among citizens, as opposed to establishing correlations with observational data (Gabel 1998). Hence, this project also advances research on Europeanization by specifying and testing a causal link between the EU and attitudes on domestic policies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). By examining the role of international organizations in opinion formation, this project elucidates the impact of transnational actors on state-society relations (affecting opinions on gender equality) (Risse 2010). EU-based opinion formation, if it exists, implies a changing relationship between citizens and a supranational polity; where one's attention shifts away from the state government and towards a new political center (Haas 1958).

Table 2.1: Percentages of survey responses by evaluations of EU economic benefits and one's belief that men should be paid more than women.

	Agreeing that men should be paid more than women	Disagreeing that men should be paid more than women
Economic benefits from the EU likely	3.3% (30)	55.7% (506)
Economic benefits from the EU unlikely	3.1% (28)	37.9% (344)

Number of survey responses in parentheses. Source: September 2014 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Table 2.2: Determinants of support for an equal-pay-for-equal-work policy proposal.

EU Benefits Unlikely	-0.5
	(0.3)
EU Certainty Treatment	0.07
	(0.3)
EU Emphasis Treatment	0.3
	(0.3)
Certainty*EU Benefits Unlikely	-0.3
	(0.4)
Emphasis*EU Benefits Unlikely	-0.7
	(0.4)
Emphasis*Certainty	-0.4
	(0.4)
Emphasis*Certainty*EU Benefits Unlikely	1.1*
	(0.6)
Constant	7.1***
	(0.2)
BIC	4,171
Survey Responses	926
R^2	0.028

Dependent variable: Support for the proposal: 13-point scale.
EU Benefits Unlikely: 0 (Likely), 1 (Unlikely). Results
calculated using an OLS model. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, **$p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 2.3: Determinants of support for an equal-pay-for-equal-work proposal.

No EU Benefits & Support Equal Pay	-0.5
	(0.3)
EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay	-0.4
	(0.5)
No EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay	-0.9
	(1)
EU Certainty Treatment	0.1
	(0.3)
EU Emphasis Treatment	0.3
	(0.3)
Certainty*No EU Benefits & Support Equal Pay	-0.2
	(0.5)
Emphasis*No EU Benefits & Support Equal Pay	-0.5
	(0.5)
Certainty*EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay	-1.6**
	(0.7)
Emphasis*EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay	0.02
	(0.7)
Certainty*No EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay	-2.3
	(1)
Emphasis*No EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay	-1.8
	(1)
Emphasis*Certainty	-0.4
	(0.4)
Emphasis*Certainty*No EU Benefits & Support Equal Pay	0.9
	(0.7)
Emphasis*Certainty*EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay	1.6
	(1)
Emphasis*Certainty* No EU Benefits & Oppose Equal Pay	3.5*
	(1.8)
Constant	7.1***
	(0.2)
BIC	4,125
Survey Responses	908
R^2	0.046

Dependent variable: Support for the proposal: 13-point scale. EU Certainty Treatment, EU Emphasis Treatment, and Emphasis*Certainty represent effects for those who perceive personal EU benefits and support equal pay, the baseline category. Results calculated using an OLS model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

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
Figure 2.1: Support for equal pay for equal work by treatment groups and belief in EU benefits, with 90% CIs (EU emphasis frame given). Support for equal pay: 0-12 scale. Expected values and difference estimated when respondents are given an EU emphasis.

Expected value of equal pay support by treatment groups
and the belief that EU benefits are likely (black) and unlikely (grey)

Difference in support for equal pay
(Treatment effects of the EU criteria treatments)

Figure 2.2: Support for equal pay for equal work by treatment
groups and belief in EU benefits, with 90% CIs (EU emphasis NOT
given). Support for equal pay: 0-12 scale. Expected values and
difference estimated when respondents are not given an EU emphasis.

Expected value of equal pay support by treatment groups:
EU membership certainty (black) and meeting EU criteria (grey) treatments

Difference in support for equal pay
(Treatment effects of the EU emphasis treatment)

Figure 2.3: Support for equal pay for equal work by treatment groups, among those who believe in EU benefits and oppose equal pay, with 90% CIs. Support for equal pay: 0-12 scale. Expected values and difference estimated while holding the model at 'believing in EU benefits' and 'opposing equal pay'.

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Expected value of equal pay support by treatment groups:
EU membership certainty (black) and meeting EU criteria (grey) treatments

Difference in support for equal pay
(Treatment effects of the EU emphasis treatment)

Figure 2.4: Support for equal pay for equal work by treatment groups, among those who do not believe in EU benefits and oppose equal pay, with 90% CIs. Support for equal pay: 0-12 scale. Expected values and differences estimated while holding the model at 'not believing in EU benefits' and 'opposing equal pay'.

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CHAPTER 3

HOW CITZENS REACT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA: GENDER EQUALITY AND GAY RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The previous chapter suggests that effects from the considerations of EU conditionality and meeting standards did not have a strong influence on opinions about policy proposals regarding women's rights. On the other hand, messages that guarantee membership may have positive effects on the policy proposals. However, we also need to further unpack what happens when rhetoric and political messaging weds the EU with human rights, especially when the existing research suggests that the EU faces challenges in terms of ensuring domestic commitments to human rights. In this chapter, I evaluate citizen reactions to the EU's promotion of human rights. In particular, I examine how supporters of EU membership and supporters of their state's independence respond differently to the EU's promotion of human rights.

A growing body of research indicates that citizens do not pay attention to the EU level of governance and citizens do not respond to information provided by the EU (Hix and Marsh 2007; Hix and March 2011; Schmitt 2005; de Vreese et al. 2006; Hobolt et al. 2013). An explanation for this unresponsiveness, suggested by a number of studies, is that multilevel governance in the EU (as well as divided governance within states) makes it difficult for voters to figure out who to hold responsible for policy successes and failures (Anderson 2000; De Vries et al. 2011; Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2008; Powell and Whitten 1993). These findings substantiate the claims of scholars who argue

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that the EU possesses a democratic deficit. For instance, Follesdal and Hix (2006) argue that:

> Psychologically, the EU is too different from the domestic democratic
> institutions that citizens are used to. As a result citizens cannot understand
> the EU, and so will never be able to assess and regard it as a democratic
> system writ large (536).

Follesdal and Hix (2006) present a bleak interpretation of citizens' abilities to engage in EU politics. Citizens ostensibly do not assess policies in terms of the EU's involvement. However, these studies do not indicate whether deeper integration or the EU's policy agenda inform voters' choices or opinion formation. Ideally, for the EU, prescribed policies such as human rights lead to deeper normative commitments to the EU's agenda and meaningful implementation.

The aforementioned research on the politics of EU member states applies to applicant states as well. Citizens of applicant states encounter information about the EU and how their state may join this political system, and these citizens debate whether their state belongs in the EU. Questions pertaining to the EU's salience for citizens, whether citizens pay attention to the EU, and the appropriateness of EU's policies are applicable to the people in the applicant states, as well as the members. In the applicant states the EU tells governments to adopt and implement its women's rights standards, such as equal pay between women and men (Hoskyns 1996; Ellina 2003; Montoya 2013). Adopting EU laws in preparation for EU membership limits opportunities for reneging on their government's legal commitments to rights (Moravcsik 2000). Moravcsik (2002) points out that an important justification for insulating policies from national governments is

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"the need impartially to dispense justice, equality and rights for individuals and minority groups" (pp. 614). However, studies of the adoption and implementation process with regards to social policies like women's rights suggest that normative commitment to the EU's policies is weak, which hinders implementation (Falkner et al 2005; Avdeyeva 2010; Roth 2008).

Applicant state governments pass the gender equality laws required by the EU, and set up gender equality institutions, but they do not commit the resources to address the laws' principles adequately (such as equal pay between women and men) (Roth 2008). Existing research indicates that civil society organizations and citizens that are committed to women's rights provide contexts where women's rights policies are more likely to succeed, because these groups provide information to pertinent government officials and monitor/report on government activity (Falkner et al. 2005; Roth 2008). Recently, the EU took up gay rights in the EU accession process (Rettman 2012; European Parliament 2013). Commitment from applicant governments and civil society to gay rights remains more tenuous in comparison to women's rights, but O'Dwyer (2013) argues that "EU pressure can effectively counter homophobia" (122-123). However, public reactions to the EU's involvement in rights policies is unexplored in the existing research. Important elements of citizens' toolkits for making political choices are omitted in public opinion studies about the EU.

A large body of research suggests that citizens use the cues from leaders and institutions to help make up their minds about who to vote for and the policies to support (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Brader and Tucker 2009; Tilley and Hobolt 2011; Druckman et al. 2013). The consensus emerging from this research is that people may be

relatively uninformed, but they generally make reasonable political choices (based, for instance, on the political party associated with a candidate or a policy) (see Disch 2011). In competitive democracies, political representation is an iterative process where elites theoretically present reasoned alternatives (in terms of policy) which inform citizens' opinions and political behavior (Disch 2011; Schattschneider 1960). Hence, an institution can be judged as more democratically legitimate insofar as it does more to mobilize objections from citizens (Disch 2011, 111). For instance, in a survey experiment of U.S. citizens, Druckman et al. (2013) provide evidence of biased opinion formation in favor of the policy agenda of one's party, and against the policy agenda of the opposing party (partisan polarization). Biased opinion formation is critical to this study because predispositions towards favoring or opposing the EU may inform opinions on human rights, similarly to the way partisan biases structure opinion formation.

Research on EU public opinion suggests that EU-based biases matter as well as partisanship (Hobolt and Spoon 2012; Hobolt and Tilley 2014). However, Hobolt et al (2013) suggest that citizens are unresponsive to information provided by the EU. I extend the existing research by comparing those who are biased in favor of integration with the EU *and* those who are biased in favor of national independence. Hobolt et al. (2013) argue that group-serving biases in favor of one's nation or the EU inform opinions about responsibility assignment for different levels of government (pp. 157). They suggest a continuum of bias with one side representing those who favor their nation and not the EU, and the other side representing those who favor the EU and not their nation. They operationalize these biases with a variable regarding EU support:

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Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 0 to 10 scale. On this scale, 0 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed further' (Hobolt et al. 2013, 162).

However, this measurement does not directly incorporate opinions about group-serving behavior for one's nation. The EU can represent an 'aspiration group', the community of states "to which [citizens] want to belong" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 19). What is more, nations generally represent citizens' primary aspiration group (Risse 2010). I expect group-serving behavior for nations among those who feel they belong in their national community, and not the community of EU states (Carey 2002; Diez Medrano 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2004). Hobolt et al. (2013) and Hobolt and Tilley (2014) do not capture this orientation towards national independence in their measurements.

The independence-oriented and EU-oriented factions in an applicant state should be sensitive to the EU's policy agenda which seeks to take control away from individual states (for instance, if an applicant joins the EU, EU institutions could pass legislation which contradicts state leaders). I argue that EU framed rights policies provide a cue for citizens which helps them decide whether rights match their interests. Hence, those favoring national independence theoretically are biased against rights that represent their state's integration with the EU. It follows that those who support national independence should more negatively evaluate policies when they are framed as advancing their state's integration with the EU, in comparison to the EU's partisans.

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H1:   Those favoring national independence exhibit lower levels of support for women's rights and gay rights in comparison to EU supporters, when they are told that the adoption of women's rights and gay rights advances integration with the EU.

Political institutions at the European and national levels have been more deeply involved in promoting women's rights in comparison to gay rights. Hence, citizens should perceive EU frames of women's rights as more credible, in comparison to EU frames of gay rights. In other words, it is more (subjectively) believable that policy outcomes regarding women's rights would influence an applicant states advancement towards EU membership, in comparison to gay rights. The survey here suggests that citizens assign more responsibility to the EU for women's rights in comparison to gay rights. On a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 representing no responsibility for the EU and 10 representing full responsibility for the EU, the mean score was 7 for women's rights and 4 for gay rights. EU frames of women's rights should elicit stronger biases based one's predispositions regarding EU membership.

Biases not only influence one's views of policies but also influence one's views about whether the government should be held responsible for those policies (when one learns a problem has occurred for that policy for instance) (Randolph 2006; Marsh and Tilley 2010; Tilley and Hobolt 2011). Tilley and Hobolt (2011) show that biases in favor of parties (in or out of government) inform whether one assigns responsibility to the government for a policy's good or bad developments. They argue that multilevel contexts obscure the clarity of institutions' responsibility for policy outcomes among voters, and as a consequence; biases are more important for voters when they attribute

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blame to leaders for their policies (see Hobolt and Tilley 2014b). However, the argument that multilevel contexts produce more biased political decision-making has not been directly tested in the existing literature (Tilley and Hobolt 2011). If conditions are bad for policies that advance EU integration, those who support national independence can blame circumstance and not their government (which would be responsible for improving conditions), and hence; they would assign less responsibility to their government in comparison to those who support EU membership. It follows that EU partisans assign more responsibility to the government when an EU policy is going badly, in comparison to those who favor independence.

> H2: EU supporters assign more responsibility to their national government for problems with women's rights and gay rights in their country in comparison to those favoring national independence, when they are told that the adoption of women's rights and gay rights advances integration with the EU.

Hence, I expect that the EU not only influences one's evaluations of a policy, but also one's opinion about which institutions are responsible for that policy. With higher levels of responsibility assigned to their state (due to bad conditions regarding rights), citizens should be more likely to vote for parties that will help meet the EU's standards. This expectation follows the constructivist research on the spread of international human rights norms, which suggests that international organizations' messages to states may not influence the state directly (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Instead, international organizations may influence the state's civil society, parties and organizations addressing human rights abuses; which mobilize against the government. Hence, publicizing the EU's standards can encourage citizens to hold their state

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politicians to account for the EU's policies, because of the blame citizens feel towards their state due to bad conditions regarding the rights policies.

H3: To the extent EU supporters assign more responsibility to their national government, they are more likely to support political parties that advance women's rights and gay rights, in comparison to those favoring independence.

3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

In order to test the hypotheses, I use data from an original survey experiment conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2015 with a representative sample of one thousand respondents. The nationally representative sample of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recruited by *Ipsos*. The sample includes 1000 adults (18+). The response rate was 67.8 percent. *Ipsos* uses random iterative weighting (RIM) in order to offset sampling biases with regards to sex, age, ethnicity, and rural/urban settlements. If I estimate the effects presented here without respect to the recommended weighting, the statistically significant results hold at a 90 percent confidence level, as opposed to a 95 percent confidence level, and my substantive interpretation of the results does not change. The survey consisted of face-to-face, computer-assisted interviews. A survey experiment is advantageous for examining the hypotheses, because it allows me to control the information which the respondents receive, and the randomized treatments (exposure to the information) allow me to make clearer causal predictions. I replicate the hypothesis testing with two issue areas: equal pay for equal work between women and men, and the equal treatment for gay people in the workplace.

Opinions about women's rights and gay rights provide a point of comparison between human rights, which show the relative unpopularity of gay rights and the

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marginalized status of gay people in Bosnia. For instances, 55 percent of respondents do not think it is appropriate to report job promotions that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, 55 percent of respondents tend to not see the government as responsible for the treatment of gay people, 66 percent of respondents said they would be less likely to help lobby for gay rights if a gay rights activist asked them to help, and 72 percent of respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to gay people as a social group (1.5 percent identify as extremely close to gay people as a group). For women's rights, 33 percent of respondents do not think it is appropriate to report job promotions that discriminate on the basis of gender, 22 percent of respondents tend to not see the government as responsible for gender inequality in pay, 28 percent of respondents said they would be less likely to help lobby for women's rights if a women's rights activist asked them to help, and six percent of respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to women as a social group (51 percent identify as extremely close to women as a group).

The experiment was carried out in Bosnia, which is a state trying to join the EU. Hence, individuals face the political choice to support EU membership or remain more independent. The experiment contains two stages. The first stage corresponds to hypothesis one. Respondents are asked for their opinion about equal pay, and equal pay is addressed as an EU standard (or not) before the respondents report their opinion regarding this issue. I address rights as conditions for membership, because the conditions represent the principles EU officials espouse for all members to share including the applicant during the accession process. Political players including women's rights organizations frame policies in terms of 'EU conditions' in order to leverage for support in the accession process (Roth 2007; 2008). The second stage corresponds to

hypotheses two and three. The same respondents are randomly assigned to be in or out of another treatment (producing four treatment groups). For the second treatment, respondents are told that experts contend that Bosnia is worse in terms of gender inequality in pay, in comparison to other European countries. In the control group, respondents are not provided a message about the bad conditions. Afterwards, respondents are asked about how much responsibility they assign to the government for pay inequality. For hypothesis three, the respondents also are asked about their potential support for political parties that want to spend the resources necessary to adequately address inequality in pay. The same stages are used with respect to equal treatment for gay people in the workplace. All respondents received questions for both women's rights and gay rights issues, and half of the respondents randomly received the equal treatment questions first and half of the respondents received the equal pay questions first. The same treatment and control groups corresponded for both issue areas. For instance, if one received the 'EU condition' treatment for equal pay, they also received it for equal treatment. All of the groups received questions about their support for EU membership or national independence at the beginning of the survey, which allows me to divide the sample into 'EU supporters' and 'independence supporters'. The exact wording for the survey is found in the Appendix.

3.2 RESULTS

I first examine the association between support for EU membership with policy evaluations and attribution of responsibility. These associations may suggest that independence supporters and EU supporters exhibit different levels of support for rights policies and different levels of blame towards their government for rights. The data

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indicate that there is not a strong correlation between the variables of interest. Table 1

shows the mean evaluations scores (on a 0-10 scale) for equal pay between women and

men, and equal treatment of gay people. Table 2 shows the mean scores (on a 0-10)

scale) for attributions of responsibility for equal pay and equal treatment. Tables 1 and 2

include the respondents from the control groups that received no extra information (the

experimental treatments).

The different groups for equal pay evaluations and attributions had similar scores,

regardless of their status as a supporter of EU membership or not. For the equal

treatment of gay people, independence supporters tended to be less supportive than EU

supporters. Independence supporters also were less likely to assign responsibility to their

government for equal treatment in comparison to gay people. Government assignment

refers to the regional governments (entities), which have control over the implementation

of these workplace conditions and salary policies.   These results suggest that there is not

a 'consensus view' on how these issues relate to EU membership.

Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the possible ways in which EU membership preference,

evaluations of the issues and responsibility-assignment are correlated. However, the

causal order of the variables is not clear. With only observational data, I would not know

the extent the policy evaluations and responsibility-assignment causes membership

preferences, or to the extent they are themselves a product of one's membership

preference. The experiment tests whether an EU frame for a policy informs the

evaluations of rights policies, as I provide voters with information on whether the rights

issue is a condition for EU membership. I then observe how this treatment affects

evaluations of rights by one's preference for EU membership or state independence. The

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expectation is that if independence supporters are told an issue is a condition for EU membership, they will have more negative evaluations, in comparison to EU supporters, than if they were not told the issue is a condition for membership. Table 3 shows the results, with two OLS regressions separately predicting evaluations of equal pay and equal treatment (on a 0-10 point scale, with 10 representing a positive evaluation), with explanatory variables for the treatment and EU membership preference (dummy indicating support for EU membership), and an interaction between the treatment and EU membership preference.

I do not find evidence in favor of hypothesis one, which posits that an EU frame influences citizens' evaluations of rights policies. The effect of the framing on rights evaluations is not significantly conditioned by support for EU membership or independence. Telling EU supporters that gender equality is a condition for EU membership does not make them more likely to support gender equality. The models suggest that support for equal pay and equal treatment may decrease among EU supporters, although these effects neither statistically or substantively significant. These effects hold across both issue areas, which suggests that considerations of the EU are not biasing evaluations of equal pay and equal treatment, directly.

Table 4 shows two OLS regressions predicting the equal pay and equal treatment responsibility-assignment scores (on a 0-10 scale), for the respondents, with two independent dummy variables for the treatments (bad conditions information from an expert compared to the reference category of no performance information, and the EU frame treatment), a dummy variable for one's EU membership preference, and the interaction between the three.

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Figure 1 illustrates the size of the treatment effects on the responsibility attributed to the government, among those who received the EU frame treatment (Figures 1 and 2 represent a three way interaction effect plot from the 'equal pay' model in Table 4). Following the expectations, when independence supporters received negative information concerning inequality in pay, the responsibility they assigned to the government decreased, in comparison to EU supporters. The differences in expected values (the bottom half of the figures) represent the treatment effect from the bad conditions treatment. Figure 2 shows the expected values of the responsibility scores by the bad conditions treatment and one's status as an EU membership or state independence supporter, among those who did not receive the EU frame treatment. Without the EU frame, independence supporters and EU membership supporters responded similarly to the bad conditions information. Both groups increased the responsibility they assigned to the government, and the treatment effect sizes (the differences in expected values) for the two groups were not statistically distinguishable. The evidence regarding equal pay, in favor of Hypothesis 2, suggests that the EU frame influences the institutions towards which citizens assign responsibility. The frame turns independence supporters away from blaming their government for inequality in pay. The effect of the negative evaluation treatment on evaluations of equal pay is conditioned by support for EU membership or independence. However, this significant effect does not hold in the model for the equal treatment of gay people.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is split into two autonomous regions (entities), which allows for a further investigation into citizens' responsibility-assignment. In the FBiH (which has 11 parliaments) people theoretically are less sure of which level of government is

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responsible for human rights policies, in comparison to the RS (which has one parliament). Biases with regards to support for EU membership or state independence would help political decision-making in the absence of a clearer hierarchy of authority. In Table 5, I created subsets for the two entities for the equal pay model in Table 4, and the effects of the treatments are much larger (and with higher levels of statistical significance) in the FBiH, in comparison to the RS. This evidence helps back up the previous finding with regards to responsibility assignment, because the effects are stronger in the FBiH where biases should be more important to opinion formation about institutional responsibility.

Following hypothesis three, I examine the extent to which the changes in responsibility assignment (from the equal pay model in Table 4) affect support for a political party that supports the reforms necessary to ensure equal pay for equal work (funding enough labor inspectors to monitor businesses). I use a structural equation models, which follow Imai et al. (2010) approach to mediation analysis. Structural equation models are appropriate because they allow me to test for an association between the treatment effects in Figure 1 (changes in responsibility assignment) and support for a rights-friendly party. I first estimate the effects of the bad conditions treatment on the responsibility assigned to the government (*Attribution to the Government*), under the condition of the EU frame. The results shown in Table 6 as the "mediating model" are the same as the equal pay model in Table 4. *Attribution to the Government* serves as the mediator. I expect that the bad conditions treatment affects *Attribution*, and this change in *Attribution* in turn affects support for the feminist party.

I previously showed that the bad conditions treatment produces a negative effect on *Attribution* among those supporting independence, who absolve the government of blame for problems with equal pay. On the other hand, the bad conditions treatment produced a positive effect on *Attribution* among EU Membership Supporters, who blame the government for problems with equal pay. I hypothesize that these treatment effects influence support for feminist parties via *Attribution*. Biases regarding EU membership are expressed through support for the feminist parties (which want to spend the resources to implement equal pay adequately). For independence supporters, since they absolve the government of blame for equal pay, they should be less likely to vote for feminist parties; thereby hindering the EU's reform agenda. For EU supporters, since they blame the government for equal pay, they should be more likely to vote for feminist parties; thereby furthering the EU's reform agenda. In other words, effects from the EU frame on support for women's rights occur when respondents receive information about the conditions for that policy (blaming or absolving the government based on EU biases).

I estimate "mediating" effects which suggest whether support for feminist parties changes to some extent when the bad conditions affects the blame the government receives for women's rights. I estimate a 'Mediating Model' where Attribution is the dependent variable (see Table 6). I also estimate an outcome model where I treat *Attribution* as an explanatory variable and support for feminist parties as a dependent variable. I hold the treatment effects at "1" (or "on") in the Outcome Model. I take the difference in the expected value of support for the feminist party between two models: 1) one model where the value of *Attribution* equals the outcome from the Mediating Model where the Bad Conditions Treatment is "1" (or "on"), and 2) one model where the value

of *Attribution* equals the outcome from the Mediating Model where the Bad Conditions Treatment is "1" (or "off"). I repeat this procedure twice: once for those supporting EU membership (holding *EU Membership Supporter* at "1") and once for those supporting independence (holding *EU Membership Supporter* at "0"). These effects show the extent to which the Bad Conditions Treatment influences support for feminist parties, due to the extent that one blames the government for inequality in pay.

I estimated these effects using statistical simulations, and I present bar graphs representing the effects in Figure 3. The grey difference values represent the independence supporters, and black difference values represent EU supporters. To the extent that independence supporters changed in *Attribution* from the *Bad Conditions Treatment*, support for feminist parties decreased, in comparison to EU supporters. As part of a robustness check, these findings hold when the dependent variable (support for feminists) is replaced with two other variables: 1) willingness to call or email politicians about equal pay if a women's rights activist asked you, and 2) one's support for letting the EU have control over equal pay policies. EU supporters were more likely to contact politicians and allow the EU to have control, while independence supporters were less likely for both variables. If I estimate the effects from Figure 3 without the EU frame, the increased blame among both independence and EU membership supporters (from Figure 2) led to corresponding increases in support across the three outcome variables. If I graph results without the EU frame, independence supporters and EU membership supporters responded similarly to information regarding inequality pay. The EU frame led independence supporters to blame the government for inequality in pay, and in turn they tended to support parties and causes which align their country with the EU (although

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those effects were not statistically significant). Similar to the results in terms of responsibility assignment, the effects on feminist party support among independence and membership supporters were not distinguishable, when the respondents did not receive the EU frame.

3.3 CONCLUSIONS

This study represents the first attempt to test the relationship between EU biases, support for the EU's rights agenda, and responsibility-assignment for problems concerning gender equality and gay rights using experimental data. My aim is to compare the different ways in which EU biases (in favor of EU membership or state independence) moderates the relationship between the EU rights agenda and citizens' support for those rights. This relationship is critical for the rights of marginalized groups, because the EU's policy interventions may undermine citizens' support for rights. In order to examine these causal relationships, I conducted an innovative survey experiment which randomized whether a rights issue was addressed as an EU policy and whether the policy outcomes for those rights were addressed as going badly. A survey of Bosnia allowed for a comparison of treatment effects across its governing regions where biases theoretically had stronger and weaker effects. Examining women's rights and gay rights allowed me to compare effects when the EU could signal a more or less credible connection (respectively) between rights and Bosnia's advancement to EU membership.

I examined three ways in which citizens can resolve the incongruity between their EU biases and their preferences regarding issues that are on the EU agenda. Firstly, they can adjust their evaluations of an EU-endorsed policy to align with their support for EU membership or independence. Secondly, they also can adjust who they think is

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responsible for objective conditions concerning those policies, based on their EU biases. If state independence supporters receive information concerning bad conditions, they can blame circumstance and are less likely to blame their government, in comparison to those who support EU membership. Thirdly, to the extent that one assigns responsibility to the government, one can adjust their support for parties that propose reforms that improve objective conditions.

The findings lend mixed support for these posits. I did not find evidence that receiving information about the EU frame alone could trigger biases with regards to equal pay and equal treatment. However, for equal pay between women and men, I did find empirical support for the posit that citizens adjust who they think is responsible for objective conditions when policies have the EU frame. The EU frame affected independence supporters who absolved their government of blame for inequality in pay. I also find evidence that those holding their government responsible for problems regarding pay inequality also adjust their support for feminist parties. When independence supporters absolve their government of blame, their support for parties and causes that align their country with EU standards diminishes. I did not find evidence showing an effect on opinions regarding the equal treatment of gay people.

These findings have important implications for the existing literature. The argument that citizens are wholly unresponsive to the EU is shown to be inaccurate, although evidence of responsiveness is limited. This study contributes to research on EU biases by asking citizens whether they prefer independence from the EU, where other major studies do not. The evidence here indicates citizens are more responsive to the EU than the existing research suggests, because supporters of state independence exhibit

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biases against the rights the EU tries to promote. The EU frame provides a cue for independence supporters to object to the government's responsibility for this issue, leading them also to object to feminist parties and causes. Meanwhile, EU membership behave similarly when responding to information regarding pay inequality, whether or not the EU endorses equal pay. When respondents consider inequality in pay, the EU frame serves as a cue, helping independence supporters decide who to hold responsible for inequality.

Biases in terms of EU membership are reflected in political behavior with respect to evaluations of government blame, support for the EU's women's rights policies, and whether the EU should control women's rights policies. This study points scholarly research to more examinations of citizen reactions to EU policy-making, which should ask respondents in more countries about EU policies. In particular, this research agenda points to a survey of the United Kingdom which is considering independence from the EU. Does the EU frame of rights policies in a current EU member trigger biased responses from those favoring membership or independence? This question has major ramifications for democratic legitimacy in the EU. Following Disch (2011), citizens' capacity to object to their leaders' actions is an important component of democratic legitimacy. If the established consensus holds in member states and citizens do not respond to the EU, then EU policy-makers have an incentive to ignore citizens.

This project also contributes to the research on shaming states and the diffusion of human rights, because it shows that the EU frame does not directly influence opinions about equal pay. Instead, the EU frame does influence opinions to the extent that citizens blame their government for bad rights conditions. The EU's opponents may absolve the

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government and offer less support for rights-friendly institutions. Rights-friendly parties and civil society organizations are necessary for meaningful policy implementation, but independence supporters who absolve the government of blame may decrease their support for rights-friendly political parties. Existing studies suggest that normative commitment to the EU's women's rights standards is weak. This study suggests that the EU's own involvement may undermine normative commitments to the rights laws that the EU is promoting, among state independence supporters. Marginalized groups (such as women and LGBT people) cross these political affiliations and biased rights opposition among any constituency may harm its marginalized members, who must live around people who may feel less inclusive due to the EU. Hence, a future study including a panel of respondents surveyed over time could test whether the EU's involvement has a lasting effect on opinion formation with regards to rights.

Furthermore, the limited evidence regarding effects on equal pay is further substantiated by comparing Bosnia's governing regional entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). The effects were stronger in the Federation which was eleven governments within its territory (in comparison to one for the RS). Hence, citizens in the Federation live in a context with more obscured lines of authority, and biases become more important for resolving incongruities between one's policy preferences and real-world conditions (the problems regarding equal pay). Tilley and Hobolt (2011) posit that selective attribution (biased responsibility-assignment) would be more prominent in political systems where lines of responsibility are murkier in comparison to systems with clearer lines of responsibility, but until now there has not been evidence that directly tests whether the effect of these

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biases depend on one's institutional context. This study contributes to the existing literature by showing that biased responsibility assignment occurs more strongly in the FBiH, where lines responsibility are less clear, in comparison to the RS.

This study suggests that the EU may influence support for equal pay between women and men. However, EU frames did not affect support for the equal treatment of gay people, or the level of responsibility assigned to the government for gay rights. Hence, the backlash to gay rights from the EU's involvement is not reflected in the experimental evidence from this study (see O'Dwyer 2013). Future studies should unpack the response of right wing political forces to gay rights legislation. It could be the case that citizens mobilize in response to the messages of conservative leaders who oppose the EU (which occurred in the Polish case), instead of messages of the EU directly. A future experiment could gauge citizen support for gay rights when different leaders provide information about gay rights (including EU officials, conservative politicians, and neutral experts/officials).

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Table 3.1: Evaluations of equal pay and equal treatment by support for EU membership, with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.

	Mean evaluation of equal pay between women and men	Mean evaluation of the equal treatment of gay people
EU membership supporters	8.5 [8.2 – 8.8] (343)	5.3 [4.8 – 5.7] (315)
State independence supporters	8.3 [7.7 – 8.9] (107)	4.4 [3.6 – 5.1] (97)

Evaluation of equal pay: 0(men's higher pay should increase) - 10(women and men should have equal pay throughout society). Evaluation of equal treatment: 0(it should be easier to fire gay people) – 10 (employers should never be allowed to fire gay people because of their sexual identity). Number of survey responses in parentheses. These data represent the control groups, which did not receive additional "treatment" information. Source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Table 3.2: Attributions of responsibility to the government for equal pay and equal treatment by support for EU membership, with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.

	Mean attribution score for equal pay between women and men	Mean attribution score for the equal treatment of gay people
EU membership supporters	6.5 [6.0 – 7.0] (159)	4.3 [3.8 – 4.9] (144)
State independence supporters	6.1 [5.2 – 7.0] (54)	4.4 [3.2 – 5.5] (49)

Attributions for equal pay: 0(No responsibility for the government) - 10(Full responsibility for the government). Attributions for equal treatment: 0(No responsibility for the government) – 10 (Full responsibility for the government). Number of survey responses in parentheses. These data represent the control groups, which did not receive additional "treatment" information. Source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Table 3.3: Effects on evaluations of equal pay between women and men, and the equal treatment of gay people in the workplace.

	Equal Pay	Equal Treatment
EU Frame Treatment	0.6	0.06
	(0.4)	(0.6)
EU Membership Supporter	0.2	0.9*
	(0.3)	(0.5)
EU Frame Treatment* EU	-0.6	-0.4
Membership Supporter	(0.4)	(0.7)
Constant	8.2***	4.4***
	(0.3)	(0.4)
Survey Responses	904	828
R^2	0.003	0.007

Evaluation of equal pay: 0(men's higher pay should increase) - 10(women and men should have equal pay throughout society). Evaluation of equal treatment: 0(it should be easier to fire gay people) – 10 (employers should never be allowed to fire gay people because of their sexual identity). Results estimated using OLS models. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 3.4: Effects on attributions of responsibility to the government for equal pay between women and men, and the equal treatment of gay people in the workplace.

	Equal pay	Equal treatment
EU Frame Treatment	2.0***	1.4**
	(0.7)	(0.7)
Bad Conditions Treatment	0.7	1.1*
	(0.7)	(0.6)
EU Membership Supporter	0.6	1.6***
	(0.6)	(0.5)
EU Frame Treatment*EU Membership Supporter	-1.9**	-1.3*
	(0.8)	(0.8)
Bad Conditions Treatment*EU Membership Supporter	0.5	-1.1
	(0.8)	(0.8)
EU Frame Treatment*Bad Conditions Treatment	-2.2**	-1.5
	(1)	(1)
EU Frame Treatment*Bad Conditions Treatment* EU Membership Supporter	1.9*	1.4
	(1)	(1)
Constant	5.4***	1.9***
	(0.5)	(0.4)
Survey Responses	877	800
R^2	0.033	0.014

Attributions for equal pay: 0(No responsibility for the government) - 10(Full responsibility for the government). Attributions for equal treatment: 0(No responsibility for the government) – 10 (Full responsibility for the government). Results estimated using OLS models. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 3.5: Effects on attributions of responsibility for equal pay between women and men, by governing regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Republika Srpska
EU Frame Treatment	5.3***	1.3*
	(1.3)	(0.8)
Bad Conditions Treatment	3.9***	-0.20
	(1.2)	(0.7)
EU Membership Supporter	3.2***	1.0
	(0.8)	(0.7)
EU Frame Treatment*EU Membership Supporter	-4.8***	-2.1*
	(1.4)	(1.1)
Bad Conditions Treatment*EU Membership Supporter	-2.3*	-0.07
	(1.3)	(1.0)
EU Frame Treatment*Bad Conditions Treatment	-6.6***	-0.5
	(1.8)	(1.0)
EU Frame Treatment*Bad Conditions Treatment* EU Membership Supporter	5.8***	1.7
	(1.9)	(1.4)
Constant	2.6***	6.1***
	(0.8)	(0.5)
Survey Responses	547	330
R^2	0.068	0.022

Attributions for equal pay: 0(No responsibility for the government) - 10(Full responsibility for the government). Attributions for equal treatment: 0(No responsibility for the government) – 10 (Full responsibility for the government). Results estimated using OLS models. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 3.6: Structural equation models for the effects of receiving information regarding gender inequality conditions on support for feminist political parties, feminist activism, and support for EU control of equal pay policy via the responsibility one attributes to the government for the bad conditions, under the condition of receiving information saying that the EU endorses gender equality.

	Mediating Model	Outcome Models		
	Effects on gov. attribution	Effects on feminist party support	Effects on feminist activism	Effects on EU control over equal pay
Attribution of Responsibility to the Government		0.3***	0.3***	0.3***
		(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
EU Frame Treatment	2.0***	0.1	0.04	0.4
	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)
Bad Conditions Treatment	0.7	-0.009	0.3	0.05
	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)
EU Membership Supporter	0.6	0.2	0.7	0.9*
	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
EU Frame Treatment*EU Membership Supporter	-1.9**	0.05	0.1	-0.4
	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.7)
Bad Conditions Treatment*EU Membership Supporter	0.48	-0.08	-0.7	-0.6
	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.7)
EU Frame Treatment*Bad Conditions Treatment	-2.2**	-0.6	-0.4	-0.5
	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.8)
EU Frame Treatment *Bad Conditions Treatment* EU Membership Supporter	1.9*	0.2	0.07	0.01
	(1.1)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.9)
Constant	5.4***(0.5)	3.7***(0.5)	3.5***(0.5)	2.8***(0.5)
Survey Responses	877	856	850	848
R^2	0.033	0.122	0.149	0.147

Feminist party support: 0(Much less likely to vote for the feminist party) – 10(Much more likely to vote for the feminist party). Feminist activism: 0(Much less likely to help feminist activist) – 10(Much more likely to help feminist activists). EU control: 0(Much less likely to support EU control over equal pay) – 10(Much more likely to support EU control over equal pay). Attributions for equal pay: 0(No responsibility for the government) - 10(Full responsibility for the government). Results estimated using OLS models. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Expected values of government blame by treatment groups. EU membership supporters (black) and independence supporters (grey)

Difference in government blame for equal pay (treatment effects of the 'bad conditions' treatment)

Figure 3.1: Responsibility assignment to the government for equal pay by treatments and EU membership support, with 95% CIs (EU frame treatment given). Level of goverment responsibility: 0-10 scale. Expected values and differences estimated when respondents are given an EU framing of equal pay.

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Expected values of government blame by treatment groups. EU membership supporters (black) and independence supporters (grey)

Difference in government blame for equal pay
(treatment effects of the 'bad conditions' treatment)

Figure 3.2: Responsibility assignment to the government for equal pay by treatments and EU membership support, with 95% CIs (No EU frame treatment given). Level of goverment responsibility: 0-10 scale. Expected values and differences estimated when respondents are NOT given an EU framing of equal pay.

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
Figure 3.3: Effects from the 'bad conditions' treatment via the responsibility one assigns to the government for equal pay, with 95% CIs. Support for feminist parties, activists, and EU control: 0-10 scales. Differences estimated when respondents are given an EU framing of equal pay.

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CHAPTER 4

WHEN DO VOTERS SUPPORT THE EUROPEAN UNION'S INVOLVEMENT IN GAY RIGHTS? GAY PEOPLE'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The last two chapters dealt with the effect of considering the EU and the accession process on the opinions of citizens. However, we have not examined opinions among the groups affected by human rights. In particular, gay people are one of the most marginalized groups in Bosnia, and they have a high stake in the success of EU policy standards, which now include policies like equal treatment in the work place. Commitment to the European Union's gay rights standards remains weak in countries applying for EU membership. This lack of commitment presents a puzzle for researchers and policymakers: if the EU's gay rights standards have minimal consequences, then why would anyone want to hand over powers concerning gay rights to the EU? What the existing research misses is a comparison between those who identify with gay people, and those who do not. State institutions produce the marginalized status of gay people via political homophobia, such as national identities defined in opposition to homosexuality. I expect that those who identify closely with gay people are more supportive of alternatives to state authority with regards to gay rights. I find that those who identify more closely with gay people are more likely to vote for parties that want to transfer control of gay rights to the EU. Since the EU currently lacks effective gay rights standards, this study establishes an evidence-based imperative for the EU to use its

capacities to serve gay constituencies directly, such as providing shelters and counselling for gay people and their families.

4.1 THE LEGITIMCAY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

Existing research on political leaders suggests that multiple motivations are involved in the decision of international and regional organizations to address human rights. Moravcsik (2000) argues that governments use international organizations to help entrench human rights principles within their states. Adopting human rights standards in international organizations make it more costly to renege on agreements later. Government leaders can more effectively institute legal changes when they act in concert within international organizations.   However, existing research suggests that the implementation of international and regional human rights principles are often weak and ineffective around the world (Hathaway 2002; 2007). Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) suggest that the adoption of international human rights regimes remains window-dressing around the world. Pegram (2010) shows that some governments (even in non-democracies) establish national human rights institutions with no interest of substantially changing their treatment of marginalized peoples.

The problem of ineffective implementation is found in Europe's international institutions (touted to be the strongest). The EU, as well as all other international organizations involved in rights, rely on their member state governments for implementation. The EU has wanted to address human rights (especially employment and work place discrimination) since the mid-20th century. It possesses the European Court of Justice, arguably the most powerful regional judicial institution. Joining the European Union involves a rigorous process of adopting human rights principles and demonstrating to EU officials and the member states that they have been effectively

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addressed with legal and institutional solutions. Countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey undergo the political process of handing over decision-making powers of important human rights (such as workplace conditions and treatment based on gender and sexual orientation) to the EU institutions (Commission, Councils, and Parliament). In practice, however, the EU relies on member state administrations to implement these principles.

Other scholars examine public support and recognition of human rights (McFarland and Mathews 2005; Anderson et al. 2002; Davies et al 2012; Ausderan 2014; Hafner-Burton 2008). A key aspect of human rights policies is that legal change does not necessarily suggest the normative commitment of a population to rights causes. Problems with implementation hold true within domestic politics, which may have minimal international involvement. Hence, the EU's involvement in human rights means that its institutions take authority from governments on issues that require civil society input and participation. The EU has agenda setting power by prescribing rights standards which applicant governments do not choose, and applicant states joining the EU must submit to the potential of future EU legislation which changes rights standards. Without the commitment of the substantial portions of a population, the meaningful implementation of rights has less of a chance of success.

Public opinion research suggests that a number of factors lead citizens to support human rights. McFarland and Mathews (2005) show that one's sense of empathy, education level, political knowledge associate with support for human rights, while one's sense of global identity and moral reasoning improved one's commitment to the implementation of human rights principles. Anderson et al (2002) show that knowledge of government abuses increased one's recognition that human rights are problematic in

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one's state. The spread of information about abuses (naming and shaming) reduces the

belief that governments respect human rights (Davies et al 2012; Ausderan 2014), while

it also can have the unintended consequence of antagonizing regimes which may violate

rights even more than before (Hafner-Burton 2008). Shaming from the international

community is shown to increase public recognition of human rights abuses (Ausderan

2014).

While the international community seems to make a difference in terms of

recognition of abuses, civil society is an important component of pressuring governments

to *implement* meaningful reforms. Important studies in constructivist research shows that

civil society organizations respond to the human rights standards of international

organizations, and apply pressure to the government to comply with their agreements

(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Civil society is the place where

success and failure of human rights reforms hinge, especially when there are otherwise

uncooperative governments. Falkner et al. (2006; 2008) show that without the

commitment of civil society actors and bureaucratic officials and local politicians "on the

ground", EU workplace standards are ineffective. Avdeyeva (2010) shows that strong

women's movements improved that chances for the EU's women's rights standards to be

adopted in Eastern European states. Furthermore, Montoya (2013) shows that without

grassroots organizing on behalf of combating domestic violence, the implementation of

the EU's conventions regarding domestic violence remains weak. The linkage between

international organizations and citizens is shown to be key in the successful reform of

governments, especially in the contexts where the implementation of EU human rights

principles remains problematic. If the status quo is minimal implementation, then

support in the populace may be critical in terms of influencing elected officials.

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What is missing in the public opinion studies is the source of legitimacy for the authority of international and regional institutions to handle human rights. Individuals perceive problems in their society, and theoretically some of these problems are considered appropriate for particular institutions to handle. Why individuals see a problem as appropriate for the European Union to handle remains an open question. Governments give up independence when they join EU, which is an important part of the public debate over EU membership, and this loss of independence affects numerous policies including human rights. Without understanding the factors that lead individuals to support giving up their government's independence in policy-making, politicians and policy-makers cannot understand the constituencies that seek representation from the European Union. The EU offers new political institutions to citizens in applicant states, where their interests could be furthered. Constituencies that believe that the EU could offer advantages over the independent state institutions also may offer the EU more legitimacy.

Human rights require substantial contributions from civil society in order for enforcement to work, and often they do not. This problem presents a puzzle for researchers and policymakers: what would explain support for giving powers concerning human rights to the EU? This question is of importance to voters in states applying for EU membership, because they face the political choice of giving up control of human rights policies like gay rights to the EU's standards and institutions (Rettman 2012; European Parliament 2013). Once a state joins the EU, many human rights policies are subject to legislation and enforcement measures from EU institutions, as opposed to state institutions alone. Structural violence against marginalized groups across a society stems

in part from these state institutions, which commit human rights abuses against marginalized peoples (Hafner-Burton 2014).

What is more, a growing body of research shows that state authorities repress sexual minorities in order to further nation-building. Altman (1996; 2004; 2008) argues that LGBT categorizations of people spread around the world in the later 20th century. Political homophobia was picked up as a tool by leaders to legitimize their nation-building along sexual and gender lines (Bosia and Weiss 2013). For example, during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, Bosniac Muslim men (perhaps several thousand – the number of abused men and boys is not clear) were coerced into homosexual postures and/or sexually abused by Serb forces (Olujic, 1998; Bosia, 2010). Bosia (2010) argues that this systematic abuse bolstered Serb national identity with masculinity and patriotism as defining features, in juxtaposition to Bosniacs who were humiliated and tarnished by sexual norms. Bosia (2010) further argues that same-gender sexual activity in the context of 'homosexualized violence' redefines homosexual people as threats to national identities and nation-building (see also Bosia and Weiss 2013).

Ostracism and categorization by state institutions produce even stronger identity claims on the basis of sexual identity (Bosia and Weiss 2013; Marx 1998; Olzak 1983). Homosexuality as a social category and its corresponding 'queerness' are products of statecraft, which promote subjectively desirable sexual and family behavior on behalf of national interests (heteronormativity) (Canaday 2009). Feelings of closeness to queer identities reflect a rejection of dominant social norms reflected in state institutions. I argue that this feeling of closeness is grounds for support for authorities that represent alternatives to the state. I expect that the EU is perceived as a legitimate source of authority on gay rights, because of one's identification with gay people. It follows that

people who identify closely with marginalized groups should be more supportive of giving control of human rights policies to the European Union, which represents an alternative to the policy agenda of state leaders. Huddy (2001) argues that scholars need to pay attention to "subjective meaning of identity and its ability to shape groups members' political outlook and action" (519). Hence, scholars should recognize the intensity of one's identification with marginalized people (see Weldon 2011).

H1: As one more closely identifies with gay people, one is more likely to support giving control of gay rights to the European Union.

I argue that those who feel close to gay people perceive the EU as a more legitimate source of authority for gay rights issues, in comparison to those who disassociate from gay people. Hence, I also should expect that those who feel close to gay people consider the legitimacy of the EU, when making political choice to support EU control of gay rights policies. It follows that the effect of trusting EU institutions on support for EU control is greater among those who feel close to gay people in comparison to those who disassociate with gay people.

H2: The effect of trust in EU institutions on one's support for giving the EU control of gay rights increases as one identifies more closely with gay people.

Marginalized status also should affect voting behavior towards parties that want to institute the reforms necessarily to change the abusive context of marginalized groups. In other words, people support human rights parties, because of their association with affected groups. This study concerns support for the EU's control of gay rights but expectations about voting behavior concerning domestic gay rights policies follow the

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same theoretical social process: gay people's marginalization leads to support for alternative authority sources to address their marginalization.

> H3: As one more closely identifies with gay people, one is more likely to vote for parties that want to effectively implement human rights reforms for gay people.

This "marginalized group effect" should be moderated by satisfaction with the government, because people who associate with gay people (the primary stakeholders in gay rights policies, among citizens) should consider their satisfaction with their rulers more strongly, when they make up their mind about voting for parties that address their marginalized status. In the domestic context, those who feel close to gay people should consider satisfaction with government more strongly, because they are more deeply affected by gay rights policies.   Support for rights from state institutions derives from dissatisfaction with state institutions, which produce the marginalization of affected groups.

> H4: The effect of dissatisfaction with the government on support for rights-friendly parties positively increases as one identifies more closely with marginalized groups.

4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to test the hypotheses, I use data from an original survey conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2015 with a representative sample of one thousand respondents. The nationally representative sample of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recruited by *Ipsos*. The sample includes 1000 adults (18+). The response rate was 67.8 percent. *Ipsos* uses random iterative weighting (RIM) in order to offset sampling biases with regards to sex, age, ethnicity, and rural/urban settlements. The results reported here

hold with and without respect to the recommended weighting. The survey consisted of face-to-face, computer-assisted interviews. The survey was carried out in Bosnia, which is a state trying to join the EU. Bosnia is a theoretically appropriate case because its citizens and leaders face the political choice to submit to the EU's control over human rights policies, or not. Moreover, the Bosnia case possesses two governing regions (Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) which allow me to replicate the study across two national contexts. Bosnia also is theoretically appropriate because it is a site of political homophobia, where leaders drew national boundaries via same-gender sexual violence (Bosia and Weiss 2013). Bosnia is a context where gay people routinely face homophobia within families, the workplace, and in civil society; which necessitates research into a constituency which has a high stake in the policy prescriptions of the EU. Homophobia is acute and reforms relating to combating discrimination lack normative commitment (ILGA-Europe 2013; Human Rights Watch 2014). Gay pride marches have met violent protests resulting in hurt marchers.

The results from the survey reflect the aforementioned homophobic context. The translation of "gay" in the survey is "homoseksualnih" which approximates the concept of homosexual. For instances, 55 percent of respondents do not think it is appropriate to report job promotions that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, 55 percent of respondents tend to not see the government as responsible for the treatment of gay people, 66 percent of respondents said they would be less likely to help lobby for gay rights if a gay rights activist asked them to help, and 72 percent of respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to gay people as a social group (1.5 percent identify as extremely close to gay people as a group). Opinions about women's rights provide a point of comparison, which show the relative unpopularity of gay rights in Bosnia. Thirty-three

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percent of respondents do not think it is appropriate to report job promotions that discriminate on the basis of gender, 22 percent of respondents tend to not see the government as responsible for gender inequality in pay, 28 percent of respondents said they would be less likely to help lobby for women's rights if a women's rights activist asked them to help, and six percent of respondents exhibit no feeling of closeness to women as a social group (51 percent identify as extremely close to women as a group).

Following the theoretical argument, support for the EU's control of gay rights derives from one's association with gay people. In order to operationalize support for the EU's control of gay rights policies, I use the variable in the survey based on the question:

> Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to give control of gay rights policies to the European Union. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

The modal category for this variable is "0" with 34.5 percent of the respondents, and 88 percent responded "5" or less (34 percent responded as "5" or neither). This results reflect the low popularity of gay rights (a similar question regarding women's rights had 54 percent of respondents responding as "5" or less). These responses indicate that the EU has little legitimacy to control gay rights among Bosnians. However, the EU is involved in these policies, and EU membership means that governments lose independence with regards to decision-making for gay rights politics. EU institutions would take partial control of these policies. Hence, the responses to this item suggest the level of on-the-ground support that the EU would have in regards to gay rights. The

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result here suggests that support for cooperation is low, which impedes implementation. Therefore, explaining this support for EU control is important to scholars and policy-makers interested in effective gay rights policies.

I replicate the hypothesis testing with women's rights in order to check whether one's feelings of closeness towards gay people associates with EU control of rights policies, or whether these feelings of closeness associates with EU control of gay rights policies in particular (which I theorize). In order to replicate this test, I use the variable in the survey based on the question:

> Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to give control of equal pay [between women and men] policies to the European Union. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

The modal category for this variable is "5" with 36.7 percent of the respondents, and 53.7 percent of the respondents responded "5" or less (20 percent responded as "10" or much more likely). The mean for this variable is 6.1, compared to 3.0 for the analogous gay rights variable above, which further suggests the marginalized status of gay people and the relative comfort among the population for giving control of women's rights to the EU. If the marginalized status of gay people influences support for the EU's control of gay rights, I would not expect for this marginalized status to have a similar influence on support for EU control of women's rights. The marginalized status of gay people should compel support for alternative authorities which address that particular marginalized group.

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The key explanatory variable in this study is one's identification with gay people. Support for the EU's authority regarding gay rights derives from feelings of closeness with gay people, who experience marginalization from state institutions. Following Huddy (2001; 2003), I conceptualize identity as structured probabilistically throughout society, meaning that one's feelings of closeness to a group varies in intensity from those who do not feel close to those who feel very close. Hence, I use the variable in the survey based on the question:

> On a scale of 0-10, where 0 represents having no feeling of closeness to the group in question and 10 represents feeling extremely close to the group in question, how close do you feel in your ideas, interests and feelings to each group listed below? [Gay people]

The modal category for this variable is "0" with 72 percent of the respondents, and 95 percent of the respondents responded "5" or less (5 percent responded as "5", while 1.5 percent responded as "10"). This results shows that only a small percent of the population identifies closely with homosexuals as a group (compared to women, for instance, where 51 percent of the respondents identify extremely closely with women as a group). This measure reflects feelings of closeness as probabilistic across society, and measures that one's feelings of closeness to the gay people. Their feelings of closeness theoretically should confer more legitimacy to the EU which offers an alternative to the authority of Bosnian state institutions, which marginalize gay people. In the analysis, I compare those who disassociate with gay people (the preponderance of the population, "0"), and those who identify extremely closely with gay people ("10"), because they face the most marginalization and are of the most theoretical and normative concern for this study.

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Other factors may confound the theoretical links between these variables. The salience of the treatment of gay people is conceptually distinct from one's association with gay people, and this salience may lead citizens to want to give control of gay rights to the EU, given the abusive situation facing gay people in Bosnia. Hence, I control for salience based on the question:

> For you personally, how important is the debate over the treatment of gay people? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means it's Not important at all and "10" means it's Very important.

The modal category for this variable is "0" with 46.5 percent of the respondents, and 80.9 percent of the respondents responded "5" or less (7.8 percent responded as "10" or very important). People who trust EU institutions may be more likely to want to give control of gay rights policies to the EU, so I include a control variable for EU trust so I can be more confident that I am estimating a "feeling of closeness with gay people" effect as opposed to an EU trust effect. Similarly, I introduce a control for left-right ideology (21 point scale) because conservatives are less likely to want to give control of gay rights policies to the EU, while socialists would be more comfortable with EU control of those policies. I constructed the ideological measure by taking one's feeling of closeness with conservatives (11 point scale) and subtracting that variable from one's feeling of closeness with socialists (11 point scale), producing a 21 scale with "-10" representing those who feel extremely close to conservative but not close at all to socialists and "10" representing those who feel extremely close to socialists but not close at all to conservatives. I introduce a control for satisfaction for the government (11 point scale) because people who are dissatisfied with existing leaders may be more likely to support alternative authorities irrespective of their marginalized status. Lastly, I control for

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political knowledge (8 point scale) because people with a lot information about politics should realize that EU has limited reach in changing domestic policies, and the tenuous ability of the EU to change the tri-party governing system established by the Dayton Accords (producing inefficient governance) (see Subotić 2009). I constructed the political knowledge measure with a battery of seven questions regarding the names of political officeholders in Bosnia, creating a score of "0" through "7" correct answers. These questions do less to prime the respondents to consider the EU before they answer questions about the European Union, and the ability to discern one's political leaders should highly correlate with one's ability to consider the authority of the EU. In the appendix, in order to take the context of the Bosnian state into account, I include a model (Appendix C, Table 1) which controls for closeness with Bosniacs, Croats, Serbs, Europeans, and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The results hold with respect to these control variables.

I present cross-tabulations of the support for EU control of gay rights across the groups of theoretical interest, along with other important explanatory variables (see Table 1). People who feel close to gay people are more likely to support the EU's control of gay rights policies. People who feel close to gay people are more likely to trust EU institutions as well. People who feel close to gay people are more likely to be to be more on the left than those who do not. People who feel close to gay people and those who do not have indistinguishable levels of political knowledge. These means are suggestive, and suggest that those who feel close to gay people may be a constituency that is more in favor of EU powers concerning rights. However, I need to estimate the effect of

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closeness to gay people on support for EU control with respect to trust for EU institutions, ideology, and political knowledge.

In order to further test the argument that marginalization from the state influences the political behavior of those identifying with gay people, I examine support for political parties that support gay rights. Hence, I use the variable in the survey based on the question:

> Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to train and pay enough labor inspectors to ensure that gay people would never be fired due to their sexual identity. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

The modal category for this variable is "0" with 40.6 percent of the respondents, and 91 percent of the respondents responded "5" or less (32 percent responded as "5" or neither). This variable allows me to gauge willingness to support a political party that wants to addresses gay rights effectively. I expect that those identifying with gay people will be more likely to support these parties. I further expect that those identifying with gay people will more strongly consider their satisfaction with the government when they make up their minds to support these parties.

Hence, I use the variable in the survey based on the question:

> How satisfied are you with the current state government's performance? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where "0" means Very satisfied and "10" means Very dissatisfied.

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The modal category for this variable is "10" with 52.8 percent of the respondents, and 76.4 percent of the respondents responded "5" or more (11 percent responded as "5"). The high level of dissatisfaction reflects discontent with the governing system, which has difficulty passing policies (partially due to inter-ethnic rivalries) and addressing the public's concerns, such as corruption and unemployment. This variable allows me to gauge satisfaction with the government, and observe whether this variable has stronger effect on support for gay-friendly parties among those who associate with gay people.

I replicate the hypothesis testing with women's rights in order to check whether one's feelings of closeness towards gay people associates with rights-friendly parties in general, or whether these feelings of closeness associates with gay rights-friendly parties in particular (which I theorize). In order to replicate this test, I use the variable in the survey based on the question:

> Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to train and pay
>
> enough labor inspectors to ensure that women and men received equal pay
>
> throughout society. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to
>
> vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number
>
> on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means
>
> "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

The modal category for this variable is "5" with 32 percent of the respondents, and 77 percent of the respondents responded "5" or more (8 percent responded as "0" or much less likely). The mean for this variable is 6.0, compared to 2.8 for the analogous gay rights variable above, which further suggests the marginalized status of gay people and the relative comfort among the Bosnian population with women's rights. If the marginalized status of gay people influences support for gay rights-friendly parties, I

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would not expect for this marginalized status to have a similar influence on support for women's rights-friendly parties. The marginalized status of gay people should compel support for authorities which address that particular marginalized group.

To test the hypotheses, I estimate statistical models which allow me to compare levels of support for EU control over gay rights across people's feelings of closeness (or not) with gay people, with respect to important control variables. I treat the 11 point dependent variable as continuous, and I estimate OLS models. The modal category of the dependent variable is "0" (Much less likely to support a party that wants to give control of gay rights policies to the EU), so the survey item may censor the responses where the respondents may have been more adamantly opposed to EU control than the survey item allowed for ('left censored' data). Hence, I also estimated tobit models that take this censorship into account. For the following models that I report, the substantive effects remain the same across the OLS and tobit models (I included the tobit models in the appendix). In order to replicate the test, I substituted the dependent variable concerning EU control of gay rights with EU control of women's rights (equal pay for equal work between men and women), and the results suggest that feelings of closeness with gay people does not associate with support for EU control of equal pay. This result indicates that feeling close to gay people has a more specific effect on considerations of gay rights policies. I also checked if the result held across the two governing regions of Bosnia (the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the same results held. Hence, the findings operate in a cross-national context (Serb politicians control the RS, while a coalition of Bosniak and Croat politicians control the FBiH).

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4.3 RESULTS

Table 2 presents the results of the OLS models, with the main dependent variable along with other robustness checks. In the model in the middle of the table, I did not include the controls. The coefficient for EU control of gay rights is positive and statistically significant across the models, which suggests that associating with gay people increases the likelihood of voting for parties that want to give control of gay rights to the EU. In Figure 1, I graph the level of support for EU control of gay rights across the different levels of association with gay people. The two groups of theoretical importance are those who have no feelings of closeness ("0", those who have disassociated with gay people) and those with extreme feelings of closeness ("10", those with the strongest connection to the marginalized group in question). One's likelihood of voting for a party that wants to give the EU control of gay rights is substantially higher among those who closely associate with gay people in comparison to those who do not feel close; suggestive evidence for hypothesis one.

Moving to the control variables, those who trust EU institutions are also more likely to vote for parties who want to give control of gay rights policies to the EU. People on the political left are more likely to want to transfer control of gay rights as well. Government satisfaction did not have a significant effect on support for EU control. Meanwhile, those with higher levels of political knowledge are less likely to support giving the EU control of gay rights, which suggests their knowledge of the EU's limited capacity in terms of gay rights.

Moving to the models from the governing regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, association with gay people leads to further support for EU control of gay rights policies for both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the

cross-national context of Bosnia, this result suggests that this phenomenon holds in different types of political systems with different sets of leaders from the ethnicities comprising the state.

I argue that those who feel close to gay people perceive the EU as a more legitimate source of authority on gay rights. Hence, considerations of the EU's legitimacy should weigh more heavily in the decision-making of those feeling close to gay people, when they make up their minds about the EU's control of gay rights. Hence, I estimated statistical models that include an interaction term for closeness to gay people and trust in the EU (in Table 2). In the model with the interactions, the variable *Feeling close to gay people* is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that among those who do not trust the EU ("0" on the eleven point scale), one's association with gay people increases the likelihood of voting for parties that want to give the EU control of gay rights policies. The variable *Trust in the EU* is negative and statistically insignificant, meaning that *Trust in the EU* does not have a substantive effect on support for giving control to the EU among those who disassociate with gay people. The interaction term *Feeling close to gay people*Trust in the EU* is positive and statistically insignificant, indicating that the effect of *Trust in the EU* on support giving the EU control does not substantively increase as one increases one's association with gay people. Hence, I did not find supportive evidence for hypothesis two. In order to further examine whether gay people consider the EU a legitimate authority when it comes to gay rights, I replicate the statistical models with another dependent variable of theoretical importance.

In Table 2, I replicate the models using support for EU control of women's rights as the dependent variable (far right of the table). Neither feeling close to gay people nor

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thinking the equal treatment of gay people is personally important associates with support for the EU's control of women's rights. Those who trust the EU and those on the political left were more likely to support EU control of women's rights. These results suggest that association with gay people has a specific effect on support for EU control of gay rights policies.

4.4 A FURTHER TEST OF THE ARGUMENT

I argue that those associating with gay people support the EU's control, because of marginalization by state institutions. Hence, this mechanism should influence political behavior regarding domestic institutions as well as international institutions. Citizens not only face support for giving more authority to the EU, but also support for political parties that offer more support for gay rights causes. Those identifying with gay people should support parties that are more gay-rights friendly. Their support also should be moderated by satisfaction with the government. If state institutions marginalize gay people, then satisfaction with the government should be a stronger consideration among those associating with gay people in comparison to those who do not associate with gay people (if the stance towards gay people is the source of satisfaction/dissatisfaction), when they make up their minds about gay rights-friendly parties. This suggests that support for more gay-friendly leaders is derived to some extent from dissatisfaction with the government among those who feel close to gay people.

Table 3 presents the results of the OLS models, with the main dependent variable being one's likelihood of voting for parties that friendly towards gay rights. Feelings of closeness to gay people associate with more support for gay-rights friendly parties as expected; suggestive evidence in favor of hypothesis 3. Satisfaction with the government alone does not have an effect on support for gay-friendly parties. In order to replicate the

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findings, I replaced the dependent variable concerning gay-friendly parties, and I replaced it with a variable concerning women's rights-friendly parties, and neither closeness with gay people or the importance one feels about the treatment of gay people associated with that dependent variable. The R^2 value was 0.03 for the women's rights model, and 0.11 for the gay rights model, suggesting that gay rights model better fits these data in comparison to women's rights model. Moving to the model interaction term, *Feeling close to gay people* is positive and statistically significant, which indicates that feelings of closeness to gay people is positive among those who are satisfied with the government. The interaction term *Feeling close to gay people*Dissatisfaction with the government* is positive and statistically significant, which indicates the effect of dissatisfaction with the government on support for gay-rights friendly parties increases as one associates more closely with gay people; suggestive evidence for hypothesis four. This result suggests that satisfaction with the government is more of a consideration for those feeling close to gay people when they choosing to support a party that wants to address the treatment of gay people.

4.5 CONCLUSIONS

Under what conditions do voters support giving the EU control of gay rights? I show that those who feel close to gay people are more likely to support giving the EU more control, in comparison to those who do not feel close. Feelings of closeness with gay people also affected considerations of domestic politics. Those who felt close were more likely to vote for parties that address gay rights, and this effect on votes for gay-friendly parties was conditioned by one's satisfaction with the government (which theoretically is an important consideration for marginalized people when choosing whether to vote for parties that address their marginalized status). Moreover, people's

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concern about the treatment of gay people associated with one's support for giving the EU control of gay rights.

This study moves research on human rights forward by showing the conditions that connect citizens to the authority of the European Union regarding human rights. The results suggests that the European Union may have a base of support rooted in the people affected by gay rights policies, in comparison to those who disassociate from affected groups. The survey results show that gay rights are unpopular, relative to women's rights, providing further evidence for the heteronormativity and homophobia present in Bosnian society. People marginalized by homophobia in Bosnian society are more likely to lend support for the EU's authority, in comparison to those who do not associate with marginalized people. The findings hold across the governing regions of Bosnia, showing that the theoretical phenomena occur in cross-national contexts. The literature often addresses human rights policies in term of an elite process, but it is important for EU policy-makers to consider those most affected by the policies because they support their powers concerning gay rights.

This study extends the existing research by showing how international organizations serve as an alternative source of authority, which minorities support. This study contributes by showing the pathway through which the "boomerang effect" may work in the domestic context (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Those who feel close to gay people are more likely to support political parties that want to give up control to the EU, in the face of state institutions which reinforce marginalized statuses (heteronormativity). The results in this study offer further evidence in favor of this posit by showing that satisfaction with the government affects gay people in theoretically expected ways when they consider their support for rights friendly parties. The effect of dissatisfaction with

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the government is stronger among those who associate with gay people in comparison to those who do not associate with gay people. Future studies should examine how marginalized people respond to political messages from the EU and compare these responses to the same message delivered by the national government. Is the EU a more trusted informational source, in comparison to state institutions, among those who feel close to gay people?

The findings back up normative concerns in the research about the abuses emanating from state institutions, which lead discriminated groups to support alternative sources of authority. Paradoxically, state institutions themselves may be in most need of reform, and increased support for international organizations may be an ineffective solution in terms of implementing policies. Future research should examine how marginalized groups reconcile their marginalization with the policies of state institutions, and recognize the authority of international organizations. How do gay people relate their experiences of discrimination with the structure of authority in which they live? Interviews that collect data on personal experiences of discrimination and could move the research forward, uncovering these connections.

Overall, this study underscores normative concerns in terms of the commitment of the EU (and other international organizations) to marginalized people. Those who associate with gay people desire EU governance for their rights (more so than the general population), even though the EU's powers are nascent and arguably weak. EU officials may not be able to force states to adequately implement anti-discrimination policies, because of the weak normative commitment of the state leaders. Hence, in the absence of cooperative state leaders, the EU should seek out, fund, and work alongside advocates for gay people. EU officials should help provide counseling and shelters for those facing

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discrimination and their families, work to protect gay pride marchers, and protect public gatherings of gay people (see Cochran et al 2002; Van Leeuwen et al. 2006). If those associating with gay people look to the EU for governance, the EU needs to do more to help gay people directly, while state institutions continue to sustain discrimination and fail to act.

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables of interest, by variables one's feeling of closeness with gay people. Means of the variables of interest. 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. Number of observations in parentheses.

	Feeling close to gay people	Not feeling close to gay people
Giving the EU control of gay rights	4.56 [3.79-5.33] (59)	2.81 [2.62-3.00] (779)
Giving the EU control of women's rights	6.74 [6.17-7.30] (76)	6.00 [5.80-6.20] (823)
Equal treatment for gay people is important	5.40 [4.45-6.35] (62)	2.38 [2.16-2.60] (776)
Trust in EU institutions	6.37 [5.76-6.99] (78)	5.42 [5.20-5.63] (851)
Dissatisfaction with the government	7.83 [7.16-8.51] (78)	7.92 [7.74-8.11] (858)
Ideology (Right-Left)	1.80 [0.90-2.70] (61)	0.64 [0.41-0.86] (743)
Political knowledge	3.51 [3.14-3.88] (82)	3.54 [3.43-3.66] (867)

Feeling close to gay people: no feelings of closeness (0) – feeling extremely close (10). "Feeling close to gay people" represents values above 5 on the scale. "Not feeling close to gay people" represents values below 5 on the scale. Giving the EU control of gay rights: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Giving the EU control of women's rights: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party).Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don't trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct – 7 political questions correct. Data source: survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015.

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Table 4.2: Effects on one's likelihood to vote for a party that wants to give control of rights to the EU.

	Effects on gay rights					Effects on women's rights
				FBiH	RS	
Feeling close to gay people	0.3***	0.2***	0.2**	0.2**	0.2*	-0.009
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Trust in the EU		0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.05	0.10***
		(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Feeling close to gay people*Trust in the EU			0.007			
			(0.005)			
Ideology (Right-Left)		0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.06*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the government		-0.004	-0.007	0.03	-0.02	0.03
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Political knowledge		-0.07	-0.08	-0.08	0.03	-0.05
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.1)	(0.06)
The treatment of gay people is important		0.2***	0.2***	0.2***	0.2***	0.006
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	2.6***	2.4***	2.4***	2.0***	2.3***	5.3***
	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.4)
Survey responses	872	732	729	438	294	742
R^2	0.05	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.15	0.02

Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Dependent variable of the women's rights model: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Feeling close to gay people: 0 (No feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling extremely close). Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don't trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct – 7 political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). FBiH and RS models represents respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results estimated using OLS models. Data source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.3: Effects on one's likelihood to vote for a party that wants to address rights effectively.

	Effects on gay rights					Effects on women's rights
				FBiH	RS	
Feeling close to gay people	0.3***	0.2***	0.2***	0.1*	0.3***	0.003
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Dissatisfaction with the government		0.03	-0.05	0.08*	-0.03	0.2***
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Feeling close to gay people*Dissatisfaction with gov.			0.01***			
			(0.004)			
Ideology (Right-Left)		0.08**	0.06*	0.06	0.09*	0.04
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Trust in the EU		0.02	0.02	0.009	0.02	0.07*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Political knowledge		-0.06	-0.08	-0.09	0.01	0.009
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.1)	(0.07)
The treatment of gay people is important		0.2***	0.2***	0.2***	0.2***	0.0182
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	2.4***	1.8***	1.9***	1.7***	1.9***	4.2***
	(0.1)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.5)
Survey responses	877	731	728	435	296	744
R^2	0.05	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.19	0.03

Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-gay rights party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-women's rights party). Dependent variable of the women's rights model: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Feeling close to gay people: 0 (No feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling extremely close). Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don't trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct – 7 political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). FBiH and RS models represents respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results estimated using OLS models. Data source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Figure 4.1: The effect of feeling close to gay people on one's likelihood to vote for a party that supports giving the EU control of gay rights, with 95% CIs. Dependent variable: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Data source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The European Union has taken up anti-discrimination policies with the goal of addressing Europe-wide problems of marginalization and abuse with a more Europe-wide solution. In doing so, the EU sets up standards for its members and countries that are applying for membership. The standards for membership established for applicant countries bring potential political conflict with them, which is especially consequential for marginalized people like women and gay people. This political conflict has been central to the dissertation, and is reflected in the previous chapters. This concluding chapter reviews the findings, the methods, and the implications of this study for policy-makers and further research.

The findings suggest that the EU entices politicians and the populace with membership (albeit weakly), which is often perceived as providing economic benefits. While the EU intervenes in domestic politics on issues that affect people's day-to-day lives, the EU leverages this desire for membership in applicant states by telling to governments to reform, which entails issues like anti-discrimination that can collide with people's personal values. Furthermore, EU membership can confront citizens' preferences regarding their state's independence and sovereignty. The EU's goal to have the "community values/rules" of its members promoted among states who aspire to join. However, until this dissertation, we have not tried to understand what happens when the EU's goals encounter people who disagree with the EU's values and disagree with EU

membership. We also have not assessed why the groups affected (marginalized people) want to support the greater control of the EU. Marginalized people arguably have the greatest stakes in these policies.

These findings were gleaned from research designs that employed survey experiments. Through the work of *Ipsos*, I collected a representative sample of citizens for interviews and randomly assigning the citizens to groups, which receive different information in the interviews. For the first survey experiment, I manipulated whether 1) the respondents heard that adopting women's rights advanced EU membership, and 2) the respondents heard that membership was certain or whether requirements must be met to attain membership. I examined the effects of the manipulations among those who perceive benefits from the EU, and among those who support women's rights. For the second survey experiment, I manipulated whether 1) respondents heard that adopting women's rights and gay rights advanced EU membership, and 2) the respondents heard that conditions in terms of women's rights and gay rights were particularly bad in Bosnia compared to the rest of Europe. I examined the effects of the manipulations among those who support or oppose EU membership. The fair characterization of this approach is the collection of 'snapshots' of public opinion. My surveys suggest that EU messages have anticipated effects across both of the surveys (although not consistently). Hence, follow-up studies should collect more data over time in order to evaluate whether the EU's involvement in rights policies has a lasting effect on public opinion.

This project is particularly important for women and LGBT people (groups which know no national borders), many of whom must live in contexts where they are surrounded by people who are hostile towards rights and privileges connected to their

group-status. To ignore the reactions of those who oppose rights, or oppose institutions like the EU that protect rights, may endanger the very members of society who are meant to be protected. For instance, the findings show that when state independence supporters are told that equal pay is a condition for EU membership, and that gender inequality conditions are bad in their country, they are more likely to absolve their government of blame for unequal pay and reduce their support for feminist causes (like helping women's rights activists by contacting politicians, and reporting discriminatory job promotions). The findings also show that making citizens feel like have to "jump through hoops" in order to get into EU can negative affect opinions about the EU's rights standards. On the other hand, gender equality opponents who see the EU as economic beneficial feel more supportive of equal pay when they believe that EU membership is certain. LGBT rights recently have been incorporated into the EU's agenda in applicant states. In terms of newer standards that the EU is promoting, support for greater EU control is partially derived from one's feelings of closeness with gay people.

The chapters in this volume center on Bosnian citizens' reactions to the EU's involvement in its domestic politics. By underscoring ways that the EU can elicit support and opposition to their anti-discrimination agenda, the chapters show that the EU is not "too distant" to affect citizens' attitudes. The EU, its opponents, and marginalized people have a stake in understanding citizen responses to standards for membership, which under certain conditions may undermine or bolster their objectives. In the rest of this concluding essay, I explore the interplay between the findings in this study, policy solutions geared at combating discrimination, and future research which could advance our understanding of citizen responses to EU policy-making.

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In the EU and applicant states, there are two contradictory forces affecting the prospects for combating discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. On the one hand, there is political momentum for more EU instruments to address discrimination. The applicant states have set up gender equality agencies which seek to find and report on case of discrimination, and provide support for local authorities. New government agencies also collaborate with civil society groups, and participate in awareness-raising through public meetings which sometimes include EU officials. Moreover, applicant states have drawn from women's groups in civil society in order to people the agencies.

This increased capacity has accompanied a greater array of rights issues which the EU has taken up. For instance, in the past few years, gay rights have become salient in European institutions, and the European Commission has asked all applicant states to adopt gay rights as criteria for EU membership. Issues like human trafficking have grown in salience as well. However, this greater capacity and wider array of issues has not been met with a commiserate level of commitment from political leaders in applicant states. Agencies are understaffed and have limited authority, and a wide array of issues does not mean that they are seriously addressed. Overall, the EU has spread around information about guaranteed rights without the investments necessary to make them real. Hence, this study, which seeks to understand public reactions to the standards, is critical. If the public responds negatively with regards to the EU's goals, then marginalized people could be endangered even more than before the EU's intervention.

On the other hand, the growth of Eurosceptisim is spreading and deepening, and may lead to more opposition to the EU and its policy agenda. Over the years, the EU's

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popularity has decreased, and the EU's governance has had a more polarizing effect on European politics. For instance, in the 2014 European Parliament, a wave of Eurosceptic politicians was elected who are generally opposed to the power of the EU political system. In the applicant states as well, sizable swaths of the population do not support membership, and the EU's and applicant government's approaches to accession (railroading the country towards membership, whether or not membership seems likely) may be unappealing to those supportive of their state's independence. This antipathy from supporters of independence may be dangerous for marginalized groups which have a stake in the EU's policies.

The technique of making applicant states pass legislation may have counter-productive effects as well. Binding legislation with regards to equal pay for women and men, and equal treatment in the workplace, may have produced mixed developments in EU enlargement. First, the applicant governments have often treated these issues symbolically: noting them as progress towards EU standards, without enforcing them. This means that applicant states have established laws with important implications for people's day to day lives, but have made them window-dressing. Important issues are brought to fore politically in the minds of politicians and the populace without much of a chance for meaningful implementation. This window-dressing debate/laws causes political problems for marginalized people's and the advocates who must face a more political charged environment thanks to the EU's intervention while they do not have credible support in the government. The EU's top down approach also does not involve all of the relevant actors like civil society groups, which may be able to better tailor policy standards to fit their societal contexts. Second, once the EU has elevated the

discussion of rights and effectively made the governments pass laws, objections may be riled up in the populace. People who disagree with the EU's values may resent the feeling that rights issues are imposed. People who do not want to be part of the EU may resent the issues more than otherwise since their advancement leads their country to EU membership. The findings suggest that these phenomena can be primed within the context of survey experiments, which sets the stage for further studies which can elaborate upon the lasting impact of the EU's involvement in these issue areas. Data collected over time can help substantiate this or not.

Several policy implications can be extrapolated from the findings in this study. I split the implications into three areas: how the EU should change its messaging in applicant countries, how the EU should partner with national governments when administering their programs, and how civil society groups should partner with the EU. First, this study most directly connects the EU's messaging and communication in the applicant states. The EU received criticism after the 2004 enlargement (the Central and Eastern European countries, Cyprus, and Malta) for not involving all of the relevant actors in the negotiations with the applicant governments. NGOs and civil society groups were excluded. Critics noted the failure in implementation of the EU's policies. Hence, the European Commission established civil society dialogues where EU officials, government officials, and civil society activists could get together and exchange their perspectives. The EU's stated goal is including as much of the public as possible. However, as mentioned above, the EU's endeavor in policy-making has largely been legislative and the implementation of human rights standards has been problematic.

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Hence, the EU is actively involved in awareness raising about reforms that have so far been limited in scope.

The findings here suggest that there are particular consequences for the EU's messaging as well as the connection between setting standards for membership and important human rights issues. The "carrot on the stick" did not work. The idea of enforcing reforms does not resonate well with those who are opposed to rights issues or EU membership. Following research on economic sanctions, punitive measures can enforce compliance but they also can foster resentment especially if the sources of authority imposing sanctions are perceived to the illegitimate. The EU's status as an external authority arguably exacerbates this phenomenon in the applicant states. Not only is the EU being punitive but it can be perceived as illegitimate (Duch and Stevenson 2010).

Interestingly, the results in the study suggest that showing a clear path to membership yields a positive effect in opinions among opponents of gender equality who see economic benefits from the EU. Hence, the EU's enticements can move opinions in the direction the EU wants, but only when the barriers to membership are removed (perceptually). When the rewards are clear, opinions move positively. Hence, optimism about membership should be more so discussed among politicians when they address EU membership with the public. Making EU membership seem inevitable could boost the changes for positive opinion movement. A future study can unpack whether the effect of rewards can boost the legitimacy of the EU. Of course, this type of messaging would be a mixed bag because Eurosceptics respond negatively to issues being addressed as EU conditions, or EU issues. It could be the case that Eurosceptic politicians could use the

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EU label to get their adherents to double-down against the EU and EU issues, when the EU ties rights to membership.

Secondly, the findings point to the ways in which the EU should administer program. The findings and the implications discussed above also speak to changes in how the EU and applicant governments should involve civil society groups, and carry their implementation of rights laws. The biggest take away with regards to these relationships is the chapter on gay rights and those who feel close to gay people. Gay people represent a highly marginalized group in applicant states like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Turkey. The findings here suggest that the EU may not move opinions on gay rights, but I argue that the EU has an obligation to these groups. Those who feel close to gay people are more likely to support the EU's control of gay rights policies, even when controlling for important variables like support for the EU. If the EU is intervening, and not making much progress with national politicians (in terms of their support for rights), they should provide more goods and services to marginalized people themselves. Overall, the general population does not want the EU to have control and gay people are more or less willing to give the EU a shot at governance over these issues. Theoretically, systematic discrimination has led to a higher level of support for governance from an alternative authority source, among those who feel close to gay people. Hence, the EU should become directly involved in programs that can provide resources, information, and shelter for gay people. This assistant to gay people also is justified, because of the difficulty in instituting gay rights without broad popular support.

In socially conservative countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopting gay rights arguably goes an extra step conceptually in comparison to many women's rights

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such as equal pay for equal work. For equal pay for equal work, equal pay becomes

attached to one's personhood as a woman when it is guaranteed is a right. On the other

hand, gay rights ask for a transformed conceptualization of personhood along erotic lines,

which can lead to objections in comparison to other rights. From this new

conceptualization of personhood, equal treatment in the workplace can be attached.

According to Judith Butler, discourses in gay rights intervene in the social process in

which personhood (being human) is articulated. This challenging situation for gay rights

means that their discourses can be a source of backlash which is perhaps revealed in the

very low support for gay rights shown in the study here.

       Other pitfalls can be encountered by policy-makers and advocates when

attempting to institute gay rights. Officials promoting gay rights internationally have

often deployed rhetoric termed "homoprotectionism" by Keating (2014), where the state

is the vehicle for anti-homophobic social transformation. As Hillary Clinton suggested in

2011, "progress comes from changes in law… Laws change, then people will" (Clinton

in Keating 2013, 247). Politically, homoprotectionism works to help garner support from

those who hope to put the state more deeply in service of reforms. In other words, they

help attract center-left/socialist voters. However, this motivation and its agenda in terms

of rights' promotion may have counterintuitive effects. Homoprotectionist discourses,

especially coming from the US and the EU are deeply linked to and embedded in

inequitable global relations of power; thereby tying homosexual people to the agendas of

the EU and US which many view as imperialistic. This political process of linking,

embedding, and tying is strongly represented in the EU accession process where the EU

tells applicant countries what it means to be an EU member in terms of rights support.

Applicant states theoretically experience a stronger sense of intervention from an external institution than any other case around the world. The homoprotectionism of the EU may have helped gay people achieve some changes in policy, but the "high cost of acquiescing to unjust power relations within and between states" may make the job of advocates (trying to persuade the public and politicians to change) even more difficult than it would be otherwise (Bosia and Weiss 2013).

Thirdly, the findings suggest how the EU should further reach out to civil society groups in the EU accession process. In place of the "hard" legal measures which may antagonize opponents of human rights and the EU, the EU could promote more soft law frameworks that allow for civil society input and tailoring to localized situations. A problem for the EU in general is that framing a rigid legal measure is difficult because understandings of violence and discrimination are "culturalized" where many Europeans perceive practices such as the ostracizing of gay people and honor killings as abnormal parts of European society. The aforementioned friction between "European" norms and domestic practices could be counter- productive. Hence, local officials and activists can help frame human rights as by and for the people involved in a particular community, and not frame as a policy that is being imposed by an external power. This soft law approach may be especially important for LGBT rights because the international recognition of same-sex sexualities and gender diversity across cultures is leading to friction between the "gay/LGBT" politics of the EU and US and the "local/traditional" values in communities where these rights are being imported, despite longstanding same-sex loving practices that are present around the world. Overall, this study underscores normative concerns in terms of the commitment of the EU (and other international

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organizations) to marginalized people. Those who feel close to gay people desire more EU governance for their rights, in comparison to those who do not feel close. This association is found even though the EU's powers are weak, and EU officials are not able to make states effectively implement anti-discrimination policies that would help gay people. Therefore, laws are passed without much effect, and political tensions are escalated without much gain for gay people in terms of enforced rights. I recommend that the EU do more to help gay communities directly by helping to provide counseling and shelters for those facing discrimination and their families, work to protect gay pride marchers, and protect public gatherings of LGBT people.

In order to extend my dissertation project, I plan to further explore opinions about gay rights. The survey experiments in my dissertation suggest that the EU's endorsement did not move opinions about the equal treatment of gay people. One possible explanation is that survey questions regarding gay people elicit people's sexual mores, which may not be easily moved by political messages, in comparison to questions regarding gender and pay inequalities. Scholars have not measured the reactions of people with different sexual mores (here, one's comfort with publically discussing same-sex attraction and intimacy) to the rights policies, such as equal treatment in the workplace and same-sex marriage. This posit necessitates an experimental design where respondents hear vignettes addressing gay rights in either sexual or non-sexual terms (freedom for same-gender intimacy, or freedom for gay people, for instances). Then the survey would gauge opinions about gay rights, the dependent variable. I expect that people who prefer to not publically discuss same-sex attraction will be more strongly influenced to support gay rights if this issue is addressed in non-sexual terms. This study will be useful for both the

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growing body of LGBT politics research and LGBT advocacy groups trying to reach out to communities with conservative mores, and promote acceptance of homosexuality. I plan to include these items in my next set of surveys in the United Kingdom. With the help of my stipend, I will collect the data for this project by December 2016. I will present my research to colleagues and students in the spring of 2017, and I will submit the resulting manuscript to a journal by May 2017.

In order to further extend my research agenda, I plan to examine the effect of politicians' endorsements on support for gay rights. According Michael Bosia and Meredith Weiss, scholars often omit how political homophobia is a tool for nation-building, which establishes national identity in contrast to queer identities (examples include Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Uganda). What the existing research misses is a comparison of opinions among the stakeholders in gay rights: people who associate with marginalized peoples affected by human rights policies, gay people in this study. Human rights abuses stem centrally from state institutions, which marginalize people within populations. In particular, state institutions produce the marginalized status of gay people via political homophobia (for instances, national identities defined in opposition to homosexuality, and laws which privilege heterosexual relationships). Hence, I expect that those who identify more closely with gay people are more supportive of alternatives to state authority with regards to gay rights. The analysis will be based on an original survey experiment of Turkey, an applicant for EU membership. When survey respondents are told that EU officials endorse gay rights, I expect that those identifying with gay people assign more responsibility to the government for addressing gay rights, in comparison to respondents told that national officials endorse gay rights. This study

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contributes to EU public opinion research by showing whether marginalized people, who have a stake in the EU's rights policies, provide a constituency that trusts EU leadership. I hope to collect the data for this project by December 2017. I will present my research to colleagues and students in the spring of 2018, and I will submit the manuscript to a journal by May 2018.

My proposed research underscores normative concerns in terms of the commitment of the EU (and other international organizations) to marginalized people. EU officials may not be able to force states to adequately implement anti-discrimination policies, so they should seek out, fund, and work alongside advocates for LGBT people. Hence, EU officials should help provide counseling and shelters for those facing discrimination and their families, work to protect gay pride marchers, and protect public gatherings of LGBT people. The EU needs to do more to help LGBT people directly, while state institutions continue to sustain discrimination and fail to act.

In order to further expand my dissertation project, I plan to further explore how the EU's policy interventions affect people with different predispositions about EU membership. This dissertation focused on an applicant state, where a country is working to join the EU. In applicant states, citizens consider whether they will join the EU, and whether EU standards will be able to even further affect the policies within a state. However, the EU accession process is not the only political process where serious considerations of EU membership are open to citizens. The United Kingdom is considering leaving the European Union, and officials from the UK and the EU are negotiating the terms of staying the EU. Once a deal is reached the deal will be put to a vote, a referendum. In this referendum, voters will get to decide whether to leave the

European Union, or accept the terms of the deal. This opportunity provides voters with a chance to exit European Union membership. Hence, the UK provides a case of theoretical interest to my research agenda. In the UK, EU officials and UK politicians appeal to the public about EU membership and issues connected to the EU. For instance, immigration has become a salient issue with many immigrants coming to Europe from Syria and the Middle East. Leaving the EU would allow the government to more strictly monitor and limit immigration into UK. The EU has acted to promote the free movement of people, multiculturalism, and anti-discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and religion. The association of the EU with immigration policy may polarize and exacerbate anti-immigrant sentiments within the UK. Politicians like Nigel Farage from UKIP may be able to use the EU in political messages in order to rile up xenophobia and increase support for stricter immigration policies, especially in the time period in the run up the referendum when politicians are actively campaigning for and against the EU.

The survey will include two treatments. One treatment will address immigrants coming to Europe as affected by the EU (the control group will address immigrants coming to Europe, without bringing up the EU). Another set of treatment will address gay rights growing and gay people becoming a more protected group as affected by the EU (the control group will not bring up the EU). If the findings hold from the Bosnian case to the UK case, we would observe that those who wanted to leave the EU would object to immigrants and gay rights even more when they are addressed as an EU issue.

Overall, these future studies and the dissertation itself underscore the need for politicians and activists to more carefully consider the publics' perceptions of the EU. The EU is now a stage of governance with powers and policies that are consequential for

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people's day to day lives, especially for citizens in the applicant states which may join. The EU seems to have a polarizing effect (if any effect at all) on public opinion among the supporters and opponents of membership (and the believers in EU benefits). However, if there is a key take away, applicant state citizens should not be made to feel that they need to become more "European" by complying with EU standards. Instead, EU politicians, national politics, and activists in favor of human rights should try to persuade citizens that the standards are an important part of the communities within applicant states.

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APPENDIX A – WORDING FROM THE SURVEY, CHAPTER TWO

- In your opinion, how likely is it that European Union membership has a positive economic impact on many Bosnians? (Very likely, Somewhat likely, Somewhat unlikely, or Very unlikely/ DK)

- We would like to ask whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following opinions.

- Men should receive higher pay than women for the same job.(Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree/ DK)

Four Experimental Groups:

We would now like to provide you with a few brief media statements about a recent public debate. We will ask you a few questions about your evaluations of the debate's effectiveness in addressing various public sentiments after you have finished listening to the statements.

Group 1: EU Membership Certainty, European Union Emphasis

At a recent public debate, civil society groups discussed gender equality policies for the state and EU. **An EU official told participants that Bosnia will become a member of the European Union,** *and meeting the EU's gender equality standards will make Bosnia more suitable for membership.* In the debate, the groups proposed that the state train more labor inspectors who can help enforce equal pay for equal work between women and men.

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Group 2: EU Membership Certainty, No European Union Emphasis

At a recent public debate, civil society groups discussed gender equality policies for the state and EU. **An EU official told participants that Bosnia will become a member of the European Union.** In the debate, the groups proposed that the state train more labor inspectors who can help enforce equal pay for equal work between women and men.

Group 3: No EU Membership Certainty, European Union Emphasis

At a recent public debate, civil society groups discussed gender equality policies for the state and EU. **An EU official told participants that Bosnia won't become a European Union member until it complies with membership criteria,** *and meeting the EU's gender equality standards will make Bosnia more suitable for membership.* In the debate, the groups proposed that the state train more labor inspectors who can help enforce equal pay for equal work between women and men.

Group 4: No EU Membership Certainty, No European Union Emphasis

At a recent public debate, civil society groups discussed gender equality policies for the state and EU. **An EU official told participants that Bosnia won't become a European Union member until it complies with membership criteria.** In the debate, the groups proposed that the state train more labor inspectors who can help enforce equal pay for equal work between women and men.

Section 5: Dependent Variable Measures

- How do you feel about the proposal crafted by civil society groups about equal pay between women and men? Strongly support the proposal/ Support the proposal/Neither support or oppose/Oppose the proposal/Strongly oppose the proposal about equal pay

- Suppose you were asked to vote for a party approving of the proposal about equal pay: how much more likely would you be to vote for the party:
  Much more likely than I normally would be/Somewhat more likely than I normally would be/Neither more or less likely than I normally would be/Somewhat less likely than I normally would be/Much less likely than I normally would be

- How willing would you say you are to pay more taxes in order to pay for the inspectorates discussed in the proposal? Very Willing, Willing to Some Extent, Neither willing or not willing, Not willing, Very Unwilling

APPENDIX B – WORDING FROM THE SURVEY, CHAPTER THREE

If a referendum on European Union membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina was held tomorrow, would you vote for membership, or would you vote for this country to remain more independent? (EU membership, Remain independent)

Women's rights

Stage 1, Group 1

Next, we would like to ask you about equal pay between women and men.

Promoting equal pay between women and men is a requirement for joining the European Union.

On a zero to ten scale where:

- "0" represents the belief that men's higher pay than women should become even higher,

- "5" represents the belief that pay should stay the way it is now, and

- "10" represents the belief that women and men should have completely equal pay throughout society,

Where would you place yourself?

Stage 1, Group 2

Next, we would like to ask you about equal pay between women and men.

On a zero to ten scale where:

- "0" represents the belief that men's higher pay than women should become even higher,

- "5" represents the belief that pay should stay the way it is now, and

- "10" represents the belief that women and men should have completely equal pay throughout society,

Where would you place yourself?

Stage 2, Group 1

Experts say that the inequality in pay between women and men is considerably worse in Bosnia in comparison to other European countries.
How responsible are the entity governments for equal pay between women and men? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "no responsibility" and 10 means "full responsibility"

"0" No Responsibility – "10" Full Responsibility

Stage 2, Group 2

How responsible are the entity governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina for equal pay between women and men? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "no responsibility" and 10 means "full responsibility"

"0" No Responsibility – "10" Full Responsibility

Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to train and pay enough labor inspectors to ensure that women and men received equal pay throughout society. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10,

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where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to give control of equal pay policies to the European Union. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political party?   Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

Suppose a women's rights activist asked you to email or call politicians, and ask the politicians to support equal pay between women and men. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to contact politicians in order to discuss women's rights? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

Gay rights

Stage 1, Group 1

Next, we would like to ask you about the treatment of gay people in the workplace. **Promoting the equal treatment of gay people in the workplace is a requirement for joining the European Union.**

On a zero to ten scale where:

- "0" represents the belief that it should be easier for employers to fire gay people because of their sexual identity,

- "5" represents the belief that the treatment of gay people should stay the same, and

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- "10" represents the belief that employers should never be allowed to fire gay people because of their sexual identity,

  Where would you place yourself?

Stage 1, Group 2

Next, we would like to ask you about the treatment of gay people in the workplace.

On a zero to ten scale where:

- "0" represents the belief that it should be easier for employers to fire gay people because of their sexual identity,

- "5" represents the belief that the treatment of gay people should stay the same, and

- "10" represents the belief that employers should never be allowed to fire gay people because of their sexual identity,

  Where would you place yourself?

Stage 2, Group 1

Experts say the treatment of gay people is considerably worse in Bosnia in comparison to other European countries. How responsible are the entity governments for the treatment of gay people? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "no responsibility" and 10 means "full responsibility"

"0" No Responsibility – "10" Full Responsibility

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Stage 2, Group 2

How responsible are the entity governments for the treatment of gay people? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "no responsibility" and 10 means "full responsibility"

"0" No Responsibility – "10" Full Responsibility

Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to train and pay enough labor inspectors to ensure that gay people would never be fired due to their sexual identity. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

Suppose that you learned that a political party wanted to give control of gay rights policies to the European Union. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to vote for that political party? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

Suppose a gay rights activist asked you to email or call politicians, and ask the politicians to support equal treatment for gay people in the workplace. How much more likely or unlikely would you be to contact politicians in order to discuss gay rights? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Much less likely", 5 means "Neither less or more likely", and 10 means "Much more likely".

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APPENDIX C – ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS FOR CHAPTER FOUR

Table C.1: Effects on one's likelihood to vote for a party that wants to give control of rights to the EU. **Tobit Models**

	Effects on gay rights					Effects on women's rights
				FBiH	RS	
Feeling close to gay people	0.4***	0.2***	0.2***	0.3***	0.2*	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.06)
Trust in the EU		0.04	-0.02	0.03	0.1	0.1***
		(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Feeling close to gay people*Trust in the EU			0.008			
			(0.007)			
Ideology (Right-Left)		0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.07*
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Dissatisfaction with the government		-0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.05	0.02
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Political knowledge		-0.12	-0.13	-0.1	0.02	-0.05
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.07)
The treatment of gay people is important		0.3***	0.3***	0.3***	0.3***	0.01
		(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Constant	1.6***	1.5***	1.6***	1.1***	1.2***	5.3***
	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.9)	(0.4)
Survey responses	872	732	729	438	294	742
Pseudo R^2	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.004

Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Dependent variable of the women's rights model: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party). Feeling close to gay people: 0 (No feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling extremely close). Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don't trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct – 7 political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). FBiH and RS models represents respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results estimated using Tobit models. Data source: July 2015 survey of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

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Table C.2: Effects on one's likelihood to vote for a party that wants to address rights effectively. **Tobit Models**

	Effects on gay rights					Effects on women's rights
				FBiH	RS	
Feeling close to gay people	0.5***	0.3***	0.26***	0.2**	0.4***	0.0002
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.1)	(0.07)
Dissatisfaction with the government		-0.03	-0.17**	0.05	-0.09	0.1***
		(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Feeling close to gay people*Dissatifaction with gov.			0.02**			
			(0.007)			
Ideology (Right-Left)		0.13**	0.1	0.07	0.19**	0.05
		(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.04)
Trust in the EU		0.05	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.08*
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Political knowledge		-0.12	-0.15	-0.16	-0.03	0.0003
		(0.09)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.08)
The treatment of gay people is important		0.3***	0.3***	0.4***	0.3***	0.03
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.8)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Constant	1.0***	0.6***	0.8***	0.4***	0.8***	4.1***
	(0.1)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(1)	(0.5)
Survey responses	877	731	728	435	296	744
R^2	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.005

Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-gay rights party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-women's rights party). Dependent variable of the women's rights model: 0 (Much less likely to vote for pro-EU control party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote for pro-EU control party).Feeling close to gay people: 0 (No feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling extremely close). Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10 (Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don't trust at all) – 10 (Yes, definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct – 7 political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). FBiH and RS models represents respondents in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results estimated using Tobit models. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table C.3: Effects on one's likelihood to vote for a party that
wants to give control of rights to the EU, with additional controls

Feeling close to gay people	0.2***
	(0.06)
Trust in the EU	0.07**
	(0.03)
Ideology (Right-Left)	0.03
	(0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the government	-0.003
	(0.03)
Political knowledge	-0.04
	(0.06)
The treatment of gay people is important	0.2***
	(0.04)
Feeling close to Bosniacs	-0.06*
	(0.03)
Feeling close to Croats	0.03
	(0.03)
Feeling close to Serbs	0.06*
	(0.03)
Feeling close to Europeans	0.008
	(0.04)
Feeling close to citizens of BiH	-0.1**
	(0.05)
Constant	2.7***
	(0.5)
Survey responses	721
R^2	0.17

Dependent variable for the gay rights models: 0 (Much less likely
to vote for pro-gay rights party) – 10 (Much more likely to vote
for pro-women's rights party). Feeling close to gay people,
Bosniacs, Croats, Serbs, Europeans, citizens of BiH: 0 (No
feelings of closeness – 10 (Feeling extremely close).
Dissatisfaction with the government: 0 (Very satisfied) – 10
(Very dissatisfied). Ideology: -10 (Very conservative) – 10 (Very
socialist). Trust in the EU: 0 (Don't trust at all) – 10 (Yes,
definitely trust). Political knowledge: 0 political questions correct
– 7 political questions correct. Importance of the treatment of gay
people: 0 (Not important at all) – 10 (Very important). Results
estimated using an OLS model. Data source: July 2015 survey of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1